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New York

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriquez . . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153 *(continued)*

General debate on all disarmament and international security items

Mr. Cárdenas (Argentina) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I wish to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other officers of the Committee, my congratulations on your election to guide our work for the current session.

In the general debate in the General Assembly, we heard many important statements, including those of the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation, which contained very valuable contributions in the area of arms control and disarmament. From my delegation's point of view, questions associated with non-proliferation are today of priority importance in view of the persistence of a number of regional sources of tension that could pose a threat to international peace and security.

Risks in recent years of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in recent years demonstrate the growing importance of multilateral agreements in this field, and of the need for controls on the export of sensitive technologies related to such weapons systems.

The system of collective security established in the Charter should continue to be strengthened. In this respect, any measures promoting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will help bolster that system and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Argentina's ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 18 January last, and its decision to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) confirm its unambiguous peace-loving tradition and clearly demonstrate my country's commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Argentine Government wants the legislative process to be completed before 1995, so that Argentina can participate in next year's Treaty review Conference as a State party.

On that occasion, my country hopes to promote two primary objectives: the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty and improvements in and the strengthening of its verification system. As is well known, Argentina's commitment to non-proliferation received its initial impetus within our regional framework, through agreements with Brazil. These agreements are now being implemented in full.

The Argentine-Brazilian agency for the accounting and control of nuclear materials is in full operation, meeting the deadlines established in all the working timetables concerning inspections, technical support work, accounting for nuclear materials and coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that have been set for this year.

Furthermore, on 4 March last, the agreement on complete nuclear safeguards entered into force. This was signed by Argentina, Brazil, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. The full entry into force of this agreement means that all nuclear installations in the two countries are now under full international supervision.

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We support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the monitoring of safeguards agreements. We reaffirm that the obligations contained in those agreements should be strictly observed within the deadlines set. This is our position both in the region and in the context of the international community.

An effective way to promote non-proliferation is the exchange of experience on a regional level. With this in mind, we organized a seminar, held at San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, from 18 to 21 April, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. That seminar, which was organized in close cooperation with Brazil and the United States of America, was the first of its kind in the region. It enjoyed the participation of 18 countries of the Americas and four international organizations, the IAEA, the ABACC, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and opened up the possibility of holding similar meetings in the near future.

The complete prohibition of nuclear tests is one of the most important objectives on the disarmament and arms control agenda. The negotiations now under way in the Conference on Disarmament should not be allowed to lose their initial impetus. To this end, we should recall that the objective of terminating testing is universally shared, and yet requires genuine political will on the part of all negotiating States.

We support — and we believe that this will be conducive to the objective of ending nuclear testing — the unilateral moratoriums observed by most of the nuclear Powers. By contrast, Argentina rejects the nuclear tests that have been carried out, which run counter to that international trend and which diminish the impact of ongoing unilateral, regional and international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation.

My country supports and participates in the consultations being held in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material. We believe that, together with a comprehensive test-ban treaty, this would genuinely and effectively help us reach the goal of nuclear disarmament.

The Convention banning chemical weapons hardly requires comment concerning its major importance among disarmament treaties. It was the product of arduous negotiation and has the advantage of rendering a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, which have devastating humanitarian effects, internationally unlawful. For these reasons, Argentina joins the countries of the European Union in calling for this instrument to enter into force as soon as possible. From our national standpoint, my Government will strive to expedite the legislative processes involved in its ratification.

At the same time, our decision to implement strict controls on exports of chemical substances, among others covered by existing legislation, together with the commitment of a number of Latin American countries through the Mendoza Accord of 1991, bear witness to our adherence to the purposes of the Convention. Furthermore, at the domestic level we are taking the decisions necessary to set up the national authority required by the Convention.

As noted earlier, controls on the exports of substances and equipment that could be diverted for military purposes are a valuable supplement to the legal ban imposed by international treaties on complete weapons systems To strengthen these complementary efforts, there will be an international seminar in Buenos Aires on 15 and 16 November next on the non-proliferation of chemical and bacteriological weapons, organized in conjunction with the Australian Group. The purpose of the seminar will be to share experiences with the Latin American countries invited concerning the operation of the Group.

After many years of operating without an effective verification mechanism, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is now nearing the final stages of improvement and strengthening. The process of negotiating a verification mechanism approved by the recent Special Conference of parties to the Convention indicates a favourable trend in the direction of multilateral disarmament. We trust that the ad hoc group that has been set up will be able to complete its work in a reasonable period of time, drawing on the invaluable experience of the Verex Group on verification measures and the useful precedents of the Convention on chemical weapons.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and all disarmament and arms-control measures indisputably require an increase in mutual trust and the strengthening of the system of cooperative security mechanisms, which give pride of place to preventive diplomacy, thus reducing the potential for conflict.

In this respect, a vital component of any cooperative security mechanism is transparency. We therefore concur in the positive assessment that most nations have of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, an assessment reflected by the Secretary-General in his annual report on the work of the Organization. This important transparency measure, whose operation should be bolstered through participation by the greatest possible number of countries, has far-reaching repercussions in areas not directly associated with it, such as verification or preventive diplomacy. We hope that it will soon be possible to broaden it to include stocks of military equipment and equipment procured from national production. Only in this way will it be possible to implement properly the commitments stemming from resolution 46/36 L of 1991.

In that context, this year Argentina submitted to the Register not only data on exports and imports, but also information on stocks of military equipment. We are convinced that greater transparency in the area of conventional weapons would help strengthen mutual trust among countries in the southern cone of America.

The international security system established by the Charter cannot function effectively without appropriate regional support, as foreseen in Chapter VIII. As a contribution to the dialogue on these issues, in March this year Buenos Aires hosted the first regional meeting of experts on security mechanisms and confidence-building measures, organized within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS). The meeting agreed on recommendations on the enactment of specific measures to build mutual trust. This process, which is moving forward in parallel within the regional organization and in the United Nations, offers the genuine prospect of a cooperative security system in keeping with the new international situation.

Closely bound up with security and arms control issues is the problem of anti-personnel mines, which the Secretary-General has quite rightly described as an international humanitarian crisis. Every country has some connection with this problem and some responsibility for it, whether as a consumer, a producer or a victim of the laying of land-mines.

Along with other countries, Argentina has decided to act resolutely. For this reason, it has placed a five-year moratorium on the export, sale or transfer of anti-personnel mines. There can be no doubt that the proliferation of anti-personnel mines has become an extremely serious problem that needs to be tackled effectively and urgently in the appropriate multilateral forums.

We also support efforts aimed at channelling assistance for mine clearance. We also regard as worthy of attention the proposals aimed at strengthening the 1980 inhumane-weapons Convention.

We need renewed efforts to achieve transparent and cooperative international security mechanisms and to ensure that conflicts and disputes end in rational political solutions. We hope that at this session the Assembly will strengthen these trends which will be to the benefit of the whole international community.

Mr. Bystricky (Slovakia): I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the First Committee at this year's session.

I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the Committee; I wish you much success in that highly responsible position. At the same time, I should like to assure you of the full support of the Slovak delegation.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to address this important forum of world opinion and to present the position of Slovakia on a range of issues concerning disarmament, arms control, peace-keeping operations, global stability and international peace.

The end of the cold-war era has opened up possibilities even the greatest optimist would not have dared to think of a couple of years ago. Like other peaceful nations, Slovakia confirms its readiness to contribute to the removal of tension caused by the enormous accumulation of arms still persisting as a residue of the cold-war period.

Recent years have been characterized by significant changes in the conceptual understanding of security and stability. We consider the joint efforts of the world community to ban weapons of mass destruction to be the most important commitment of our times.

I take as an example the chemical-weapons Convention which, having introduced a ban on the development, production, possession and use of chemical weapons, has been open for signature since January 1993. As one of the first conventions of this kind, the chemical weapons Convention contains a thorough set of verification measures, including the establishment of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The mechanisms

for verifying compliance with past multilateral agreements were, for the most part, either inadequate or incomplete. Many of these multilateral arms-control agreements contained no verification provisions whatsoever. And in cases where they did, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they have never yet been exploited to the full. The inability of those earlier treaties to ensure compliance, let alone warn of impending violations, underlined the need for verifiable, rather than declamatory, multilateral disarmament accords.

Our delegation believes that the chemical-weapons Convention has become a test case for a new type of multilateral arms-control agreement. Intended by its negotiators as a remedy for the defects of earlier multilateral arms-control endeavours, it was drawn up to provide measures to verify compliance, deter non-compliance and redress a situation if necessary. In our understanding, it thus provides, among other things, for a very sophisticated and complex verification regime, and for challenge inspection mechanisms with no right of refusal in order to resolve uncertainties about compliance.

At the same time the Convention clearly spells out the balance between obligations on the verification side and rights in the field of trade, cooperation and assistance. We cannot imagine the smooth implementation of the Convention without a proper and adequate balance between rights and obligations for all member States on an equal footing. From this general point of view, Slovakia began its national implementation of the Convention after the Paris signing ceremony. The process of ratification has started already.

As a country on whose territory no chemical weapons are deployed, developed or produced, the Slovak Republic is doing its best to assist the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in carrying out the activities set up by the Paris resolution. During the visit of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission to Slovakia last July, we offered one of our facilities as a centre for training future OPCW inspectors. At the same time we made a suggestion to provide a laboratory as part of a future network of OPCW-designated laboratories. We did so aware of the fact that the training of staff and building up the necessary infrastructure will be the key elements for the effective functioning of the OPCW.

The Slovak Republic greatly appreciates the progress made during the Special Conference of States parties to the biological-weapons Convention and declares its readiness to participate in the work of the ad hoc working group to create a system of verification for the biological-weapons Convention.

The years 1994 and 1995 are of fundamental importance for global disarmament efforts. We find ourselves on the threshold of a new era. We must not miss this chance. My country strongly supports the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This would be a significant contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; at the same time it would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal. The ban should be comprehensive and universal. It should prohibit all nuclear tests by all States in all environments, and for ever.

Concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), my country wishes to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation system by promoting the universality of the Treaty and by extending it indefinitely and unconditionally. Strengthening the regime which prevents the proliferation of these kinds of weapons would be a significant step towards complete nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon States feel especially threatened by the existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, these States are worried by the fact that the nuclear-weapon States have not yet excluded the possible use of these weapons. Legal commitments by those States would be the first and the easiest step towards the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The world has changed in the last couple of years. However, military doctrines, in particular those on the first use of nuclear weapons, do not reflect this change. The danger of nuclear catastrophe is no longer of a bipolar character. We understand that responsibility for nuclear security has to be shared by all — nuclear and non-nuclear States alike — but it is evident that the first step should be taken by the nuclear Powers. We expect the nuclear-weapon States to provide all other States with negative security assurances in a universal, non-discriminatory, legally binding form.

The production of fissile material for weapons and other explosive devices is an inseparable part of the complex problems concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, Slovakia welcomed the preparatory consultations on this issue at the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that experts and diplomats will be able to convene the first round of negotiations and bring them to the successful conclusion of a treaty. Here I should like to say that, from

our point of view, even partial success is better than none. That is why we support the immediate commencement of the negotiations on the basis of the so-called simple mandate set out in General Assembly resolution 48/75 L.

Let me make some remarks concerning recent cases of illicit transfers of nuclear materials. In recent years the international community has been alarmed by the increasing number of recorded incidents of illicit nuclear-materials trafficking. Fortunately, information received indicates that only small quantities have been involved, and in no case did the material appear to have come from a nuclear-weapons stockpile. That does not mean that this problem is not a serious one. Because of the physical nature of such material, the uncontrolled movement of nuclear material, in conjunction with the interests of organized crime, creates favourable conditions for the production of the so-called personal weapons of mass destruction.

The Slovak Republic appreciates the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this field. My country is prepared to promote a more systematic approach to the problem of illicit trafficking. Closer cooperation by all Member States in their efforts to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is of vital importance. Besides the danger of such materials falling into the hands of irresponsible individuals or groups, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is a serious threat in itself. Uncontrolled trafficking in "home-made" containers could expose large numbers of people to life-threatening doses of radiation and might eventually result in a real catastrophe. This calls for a thorough re-evaluation of the effectiveness of existing measures concerning this issue.

Another area in which there is a lot of work to be done is outer space, where the core problem is the prevention of an arms race. We are of the opinion that in order to achieve the exclusively peaceful exploration of outer space, the present legal machinery should be strengthened so that it corresponds with the latest technological progress. This mechanism should also ban sending into outer space not only conventional arms, but also laser, high-frequency or anti-satellite weapons. Existing space treaties are a positive step, but they are not sufficient. The time has come to consider the possibility of concluding a comprehensive multilateral agreement banning the deployment of weapons in outer space and creating a supranational body to supervise compliance. We support the elaboration of a politically binding document that would, as a temporary measure, take the form of a code of conduct in outer space and would call for exchanges of information concerning space activities.

The United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies have been dealing with the issue of conventional weapons for several decades. Events of recent years show that now is the time to reap the fruits of these efforts. Significant results have been attained by regional organizations — as in the case of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) — as well as by the United Nations itself. It is in our vital interest to safeguard the integrity and inviolability of the CFE Treaty, especially in the process of harmonizing obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building within the CSCE, which should be completed with the full implementation of the CFE Treaty in November 1996.

With regard to transparency in armaments, Slovakia welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a significant measure to solve the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons. At the same time, we realize that its full effectiveness will be safeguarded only by universal participation. As a strong supporter of the Register, we did not miss the chance to participate in it from the very first year. My country is in favour of further strengthening and expansing the Register. We share the view that widening the scope of the Register by including data on military holdings and procurements through national production would desirably increase openness and transparency in the field of conventional armaments.

I wish to express the readiness of the Slovak Republic to take part in an exchange of information on the organizational structure and size of armed forces. Within the framework of the CSCE, we are committed to providing, and do provide, information on medium- and long-term plans concerning the size, structure, training and armaments of our armed forces. My country takes an active part in the negotiations on disarmament, cooperation and security in Europe. By signing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the 1992 Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty, Slovakia joined the process of transparency in armaments, arms control and disarmament.

These facts show that Slovakia is deeply interested in being perceived as a reliable member of the international community. The Slovak authorities undertook concrete steps to contribute to stability and security in our region. The Slovak Republic has been a sovereign State since 1 January 1993 and during its short existence has built up a transparent and effective control mechanism for trade in weapons, military technologies and dual-use items. In

compliance with General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, Slovakia presents annual reports to the Register of Conventional Arms.

The Slovak Republic supports all disarmament activities and realizes the extraordinary importance of the Conference on Disarmament as a pivotal multilateral forum for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. It is deplorable that despite the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, the task of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament has become a persistent problem. At this point I would like to stress once again Slovakia's specific interest in full membership in the Conference on Disarmament, an interest that is even greater because we are a successor of the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, a member of the Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, the Conference on Disarmament must also be able to adapt itself to its new tasks through dealing expeditiously with issues relating to membership.

Less than two years after its admission to the United Nations the Slovak Republic has become a full-fledged partner of the community of nations. We hope that this is a confirmation of the credibility of our foreign policy, which is based on respect for international law and for principles of democratic coexistence among nations. It is evident that Slovakia, as a small country in the geopolitically sensitive Central European region, must have a transparent and clearly defined orientation for its foreign policy.

Today's world is defined by dynamic changes resulting from the growing variety of international relations. There have been many important events in the last year which we deem to be guarantees for peaceful coexistence of nations, but there have also been events that cannot fill us with optimism.

We welcome as one of the positive events the recent progress in the peace process in the Middle East. Slovakia supports that process aimed at reaching a comprehensive and final peaceful settlement in that part of the world. In this regard, my country is of the opinion that the new realities should be reflected in the relevant United Nations resolutions, some of which have become outdated.

We are deeply concerned over the lasting conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We support the international community in its efforts to settle that conflict solely through negotiations within the framework of existing mechanisms of the United Nations, the CSCE and other international institutions. Slovakia welcomes any initiative that could contribute to the peaceful settlement of that conflict. We hope that the recent measures adopted by the Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the subsequent decision of the Security Council on the temporary suspension of some of the sanctions will serve as an impetus to greater commitment by all parties to the conflict to continue the negotiations as the only means of ending the conflict and restoring peace and stability in that region.

Let me conclude my statement by expressing a wish for great success in the work of the First Committee during the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Biloa Tang (Cameroon) *(interpretation from French):* As the work of the First Committee gets under way, it is important to recall that the objective of general and complete disarmament is still relevant as an item on the international community's agenda. Cameroon subscribes fully to that objective and is making its contribution to activities aimed at ensuring the dawning of a world of peace and security for all.

The common destiny of mankind requires that we act together in undertaking appropriate measures to maintain international peace and security. Encouraging developments in the field of disarmament and arms control since the end of the cold war are going in the right direction, and they strengthen our conviction that visible progress can be made if States demonstrate genuine political will.

However, the end of the cold war has not eliminated the threat posed by nuclear weapons. It is therefore in the interests of all that obstacles to bilateral and multilateral negotiations be removed to make possible a solution that is just and equitable for the entire international community. This is why we encourage the nuclear Powers and support efforts to achieve quantitative and qualitative reductions in nuclear arsenals.

It is abundantly clear that securing these reductions requires, in particular, the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for armaments purposes, together with effective verification machinery, and a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We hope that pending the conclusion of these two international instruments the nuclear Powers will continue the moratorium on nuclear tests.

At a time when negotiations in preparation for the 1995 conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have reached

a decisive stage, only genuine political will that takes into account the security aspirations of all States can promote the adoption of the principle of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Cameroon, for its part, subscribes fully to such an extension. In addition, we welcome the accession to the NPT of three new members — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia — and we encourage countries that have not yet done so to accede to this international instrument with a view to enhancing its universality.

The entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the conclusion of the treaty on the denuclearization of Africa and the beginning of negotiations on a treaty making the South Atlantic a nuclear-weapon-free zone constitute real progress in the area of regional nuclear disarmament and of strengthening confidence between States. We encourage the countries of South Asia to expedite negotiations with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and we encourage the countries of the Middle East, once peace has been restored, to do the same.

Like many other delegations, the delegation of Cameroon supports the principle of control accompanied by effective verification measures covering all weapons of mass destruction. The same holds true for anti-personnel land-mines, which, because of the great suffering that they inflict on civilian populations, especially in Africa and Asia, deserve our full attention. Cameroon endorses the Secretary-General's appeal to the Committee with regard to international regulation to limit the production, use and transfer of mines. It also endorses the proposal on the establishment of a fund to finance demining activities. In addition, it is urgent that a moratorium on the production and transfer of mines be declared by all producing countries pending the conclusion of an international agreement.

Cameroon, as one of the first signatories to the chemical-weapons Convention, has begun the procedure for its ratification. Moreover, a national authority will soon be set up to supervise the implementation of the Convention, and nationals of Cameroon have gone to The Hague for training in this area and in the area of chemical-weapons inspection. An African regional seminar on the implementation of the chemical-weapons Convention is scheduled to take place in Cameroon early next year.

The General Assembly has recognized the importance of regional disarmament for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is in this context that steps are being taken to integrate the activities of the United Nations regional centres for disarmament — which, moreover, are being called upon to play a trail-blazing role in the framework of preventive diplomacy. In this respect, it is necessary to note with regret that, owing to the lack of adequate human and financial resources, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, which has to operate in a continent ravaged by numerous conflicts, is unable to carry out its mission. It is therefore urgent and indispensable that the Centre be given the necessary means to enable it to resume its activities.

At another level, we note with satisfaction the increasing recognition of the important role regional organizations must play in the management of conflicts. Organization of African Unity machinery for the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts is operating more and more frequently in situations of tension and conflict in Africa within the framework of preventive diplomacy. The activities undertaken through that machinery deserve the encouragement and support of the United Nations.

In our subregion, the initiative of the 11 countries of the Economic Community of Central African States — Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe and Zaire — has made notable progress towards the promotion of confidence, disarmament, security and development within the framework of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The establishment of this body was announced a few years ago by the Secretary-General.

In Yaonde, Cameroon, during the fifth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee, these States adopted and initialled a non-aggression pact, which will be opened for signature by Heads of State during a summit to be held in Cameroon before the end of 1994 and which will enter into force by the end of the year. These States have also undertaken to participate in United Nations and the Organization of African Unity peace-keeping operations and, to that end, to establish within their respective armed forces specialized units for the maintenance of peace.

But if this pilot project is to be implemented successfully, particularly in terms of the training and preparation of these specialist units in a subregion in which there are numerous conflicts and hotbeds of tension, the 11 States members of the Committee must be able to count on the continued support of the United Nations and the international community as a whole.

We hope also that the draft resolution on this subject that we shall be submitting will, like past texts, be adopted by the Committee.

The democratization of international relations requires that the affairs of the world be managed with greater transparency. We believe, therefore, that it is desirable to involve the greatest possible number of States in taking decisions that affect all mankind. The necessary expansion of the Conference on Disarmament is a move towards this democratization. We therefore hope that the Committee will adopt a decision along the same lines.

Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to present to you and to the other officers of the Committee our delegation's warmest and most sincere congratulations, and to assure you of our full cooperation in ensuring the success of our work.

Mr. Berguño (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Chile is pleased that the First Committee is chaired by a man who embodies the great diplomatic tradition of Ecuador. Allow me to assure you, Sir, of our enthusiastic cooperation and to express our appreciation for the direction our discussions are taking, which is in complete harmony with the endeavours of your predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, to rationalize our procedures and our agenda. I would like also to express my thanks to the disarmament secretariat for its support.

There is much talk these days of the favorable international climate, but growing interdependence and reduced danger of nuclear war should not blind us to the fact that changes in the world situation are still superficial. The system of common security has not yet been fully institutionalized, and the United Nations has not succeeded in playing its role of initiator and coordinator of decisions. Multilateral interaction is fragile and the function of military force as a source of power remains significant. Social and economic inequalities, regional instabilities and a latent capacity for conflict remain, complicating the spread of new technologies.

The developed world has become a safer place thanks to increasingly shared values, a common perception of threats, the free market and other integrating factors. But at the world level, common interests and values are not sufficiently accepted to preserve universal peace. The creation of a superstructure with greater inequalities in terms of economic and military power could lead to an international order which might spare us from the scourge of war but which would impose subtle coercion, domination based on intervention and the modernization of weapons systems. The action of the international community in the area of non-proliferation cannot become a mere administration of the elimination of arsenals and of the waste from weapons of mass destruction. It must be a positive contribution to converting a war economy to an economy of peace, equity and development.

This is why our Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to the seventh plenary meeting of the General Assembly that

> "no new international order will be stable or lasting if it is based on the exclusion of the majority of those who comprise it." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 7th meeting, p. 40)*

In the midst of truly momentous changes we have as yet no answer to the question of whether the power vacuum will be filled by qualitatively superior forms of integration and coordination at the world and regional levels, with common security as their point of reference.

As we look at the wealth and variety of issues entrusted to the First Committee, we may well ask whether arms control and disarmament will become a permanent process embracing all military activities in a grand programme of multilateral negotiations or will it continue to be partial, selective and quantitative. The more systematic treatment of disarmament and international security issues which has been proposed this year, stimulating more detailed and focused analyses of the various agenda items, with a more effective use of available time and resources is paving the way for an the integrated approach and overall view our new times require.

Against this backdrop, I should just like to sketch a few important outlines for action which would reflect the major priorities of Chile's international policy in the area of disarmament and international security.

Our country resolutely opposes further nuclear tests. We listened with great feeling to the anguished statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Marshall Islands before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly concerning the serious human and environmental consequences of such tests. The premise underlying any nuclear test, that of preparation for an explosion in time of war, impels us to demand that existing limited nuclear moratoriums be converted into the total and unconditional prohibition of such tests. Can a truly defensive military

doctrine really be based on nuclear arsenals as pillars of security?

We wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for his skilful guidance of the negotiating committee on a convention on the total prohibition of nuclear tests. My Government has reaffirmed its readiness to cooperate in the establishment of an international seismic monitoring system for verification of a future convention through inputs from our scientists and a large network of observatories in which Chile's traditional commitment to the geophysical sciences goes hand in hand with a renewed resolve to strengthen peace and to exorcize the spectre of nuclear war.

Our commitment to the international non-proliferation regime is complete as can be seen by Chile's implementation of the provisions of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and our full membership in the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Negotiations on a wide-ranging safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna are well advanced; these include clauses more demanding than the safeguards imposed on parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). By the time Chile hosts the general conference on the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Santiago next March, we hope that Cuba's accession and that of other countries of the region will have been confirmed, making it possible to implement the of Treaty throughout the region it covers.

My friend the Permanent Representative of New Zealand has stressed the magnitude of the geographical area involved in the integration of the nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga for the South Pacific, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the treaty that will establish a denuclearized zone in Africa in the first half of 1995. Meeting in Brasilia, members of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic were quick to proclaim the denuclearization of that marine space. As progress is made towards future denuclearized zones in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, the whole of the south hemisphere will be free of nuclear weapons and committed to a system of cooperation for regional security.

Denuclearized zones are a basic component of the international non-proliferation regime, and we have welcomed the endorsement of their importance by the representative of the United States. In Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco we are lucky enough to have negative assurances required of all nuclear States. My Government has constantly advocated that similar safeguards should be given to parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

The future African denuclearization treaty also envisages this, and agreements with successor countries to the former Soviet Union that have renounced nuclear status contain similar clauses. The Conference on Disarmament will then be able to elaborate an instrument that will give solemn form to the commitment to refrain from nuclear aggression against States, as required by international law.

The continued existence of a universal non-proliferation treaty is an incontestable benefit. The Government of Chile, following its incorporation into the Tlatelolco system and the negotiation of the resulting safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has begun a process of evaluation and consultation with all sectors of national opinion with a view to deciding on our accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I feel bound to express the concern felt by a country in the midst of this decisive process at the widely diverging opinions that have been expressed in this debate in the First Committee. In the process of the indefinite or limited extension of a treaty, one cannot ignore the internal harmony of its provisions and the delicate balance among its priority objectives: strengthening non-proliferation, advancing towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament and generating a framework of confidence for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the proscription of fissile materials for military purposes and the universal application of safeguards are necessary ingredients for an effective non-proliferation regime. Balanced progress in all these areas will demonstrate consistency with the goals that the international community has set itself and will be an unequivocal signal from the nuclear States to those countries reluctant to undertake non-proliferation commitments.

Chile regards the Convention banning chemical weapons as the most far-reaching, complete and universal of international disarmament treaties. It cooperated actively with the work of the Preparatory Committee and hosted the first regional seminar on the implementation of the Convention, which has been followed by another in Lima, Peru, and a third that has just been announced by the representative of Cuba. The Paris Convention is a landmark in the advancement of verification and control measures and a major effort by the international community to establish a positive framework of cooperation and of scientific and technological exchange.

The time has come to make the visionary 1972 biological-weapons Convention truly effective. The decision of the Special Conference held in Geneva to establish an ad hoc negotiating group to strengthen the implementation of the Convention is a heartening sign. The Government of Chile would like to see a binding legal instrument emerge from these deliberations to be submitted to the next conference of the parties in 1996, thus achieving somewhat tardily what we called for some years ago, along with Argentina and Brazil, in the Mendoza Declaration.

With the exception of those on the chemical-weapons Convention, negotiations on export controls have never been carried out in a multilateral forum. The Disarmament Commission has had scant success in addressing the item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". Acceptance of export-control norms in key sectors of dual technology is spreading, but it remains true that multilateral negotiation fosters participation and gives legitimacy to control-regimes, making them more effective. For this reason, we would like to join in the appeal made by Brazil and Canada for a consensus resolution on this issue.

Over the years the General Assembly has repeatedly expressed its anxiety about the vast sums allocated to certain military budgets and about excessive and destabilizing stockpiles of weapons in certain regions and their detrimental effects upon economic and social development. We support the initiative taken by the Netherlands, in support of the political objectives of the Assembly, to enhance the effectiveness of the Register of Conventional Arms, give an impetus to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and prepare the way for a more productive meeting of the group of governmental experts in 1996. Chile has fully met its obligations under the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as well as in notifications to the Organization of American States (OAS), and it will continue to work for the universalization of this valuable instrument of transparency.

In 1988 the General Assembly endorsed the Disarmament Commission guidelines on appropriate types of confidence-building measures and the implementation of such measures on a world-wide or regional level. This process was boosted during meetings sponsored by the OAS — such as in Buenos Aires in March 1994 — which will culminate in a regional conference on confidence-building and security measures to be held in Chile in 1995. Our hemisphere is a region relatively free from conflict, with a lower level of arms expenditures and a tradition of peaceful and judicial settlement of disputes. In the Latin American subregion we have built up a commitment to the total ban on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which will be further strengthened through a regional agreement not to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile long-range missiles.

The representatives of many countries and of Germany on behalf of the European Union have here advocated a rapid increase in the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. They have referred to General Assembly resolution 48/77 B, have mentioned the completion of one stage in this process with the drawing up by the Special Coordinator of a list of 23 States, and have stated the expectations of other States if the adoption of the list in question were to free up the process and open a more dynamic phase of increase. A different viewpoint has been expressed by the representative of Malaysia in proposing that the General Assembly examine the operation of the Conference on Disarmament. These views, however, agree on the desirability of the General Assembly taking a decisive step towards facilitating the process of increasing the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, setting the rules for its revitalization. A happy conclusion to this exercise would remove a relic of the cold war and permit the Conference on Disarmament to exercise fully its role as the sole multilateral forum on disarmament, and my country attaches particular importance to this step.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* I call next on the Observer for the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Mr. Kung (International Committee of the Red Cross): First of all, Sir, allow me cordially to congratulate you and your colleagues on your election as officers of the First Committee.

Thanks to the initiative of the Government of France, we are now in the process of discussing possible amendments to the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would like to express its gratitude for being able to play an active role in these discussions and for having been asked to prepare two preparatory documents for the Group of Governmental Experts, one on the subject of land-mines and the second on other issues relevant to the review of the 1980 Convention.

The challenge that is facing the Conference is that of agreeing on amendments that will transform the Convention into a dynamic instrument. This Conference has received widespread attention from the world's media and from groups that earnestly hope for meaningful measures to rid the world of the terrible suffering caused by mines and to prevent severe problems that could be caused by other weapon developments. It is therefore essential that the amendments agreed to should yield tangible results. This requires not only clear and effective rules on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of these weapons, but also the application of the Convention to all conflicts, successful implementation measures and complementary arms-control measures.

First, I should like to say a word on mines. The problems caused by mines around the world are growing worse at a dramatic rate. The figures contained in the recent report of the Secretary-General are impressive. He indicates that, for every mine being cleared, another 20 are being laid. He estimates that it would cost about $33 billion to clear the well over 100 million mines currently buried around the world. However, only 100,000 mines were cleared last year, whereas approximately 2 million were laid. Furthermore, there are enormous stocks of mines contained in various arsenals, ready to join the others already littering the globe.

These figures do not describe the human suffering that our doctors and nurses regularly see. They attest that mine wounds are the worst that they have to deal with in practice. Neither can these figures give any idea of the profound disruption that mines cause to families, society and the long-term development of the countries affected.

A disaster of this scale cannot be dealt with through half-hearted measures. First of all, vigorous measures need to be taken to clear, as quickly as possible, the mines now in the ground. Secondly, a lasting solution needs to be adopted. The ICRC is firmly of the opinion that the only really effective measure would be to ban the use and the production of anti-personnel land-mines. We are also of the opinion that there should be strict controls on the use and design of anti-vehicle mines, which in practice have led to casualties among both local civilians and humanitarian workers, including ICRC delegates who need to use the roads to reach victims.

The ICRC notes with satisfaction that several States have joined the call for a ban on anti-personnel mines and earnestly hopes that others will do so before the Review Conference itself. At present, the Group of Governmental Experts is considering a number of proposals which are less far-reaching than a total ban. Of these, we believe that, as a minimum, all anti-personnel mines should automatically and reliably render themselves harmless within a specified period. However, we believe that, although such a regulation should reduce the amount of civilian victims, it will not prevent large numbers of civilian mine victims, since these mines will continue to claim victims during their active lives.

As to blinding laser weapons, the ICRC is pleased that a large number of States have either formally or informally indicated their support for a protocol on the subject of blinding weapons. It is essential that the Review Conference seize this last opportunity to adopt this legal regulation, as a later review conference would certainly be too late. This preventive step will save the world from the horrifying prospect of large numbers of people being suddenly blinded for life by certain laser weapons that could soon be both inexpensive and easily available. For the purposes of the 1980 Convention, a protocol could be agreed on without lengthy negotiation; it could, in simple language, ban blinding as a method of warfare and outlaw the use of laser weapons for this purpose.

Proposals that deserve due consideration have been put forward on other weapons, too. As this is the first review conference to take place since the adoption of the Convention, it is a pity that there is a prevailing sense of a lack of time during the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. The immense problem created by land-mines has meant that States feel obliged — and rightly so — to devote most of their time to this problem. However, this ought not to exclude discussion of other important issues. The 1980 Convention can be a dynamic treaty only if it deals with problems before they become overwhelming. For this purpose, a regular review process needs to be established that is able to address and deal with issues as they arise.

It is all too well known that a majority of armed conflicts are non-international and that they are primarily responsible for the immense suffering caused by the indiscriminate use of weapons. It is therefore essential that the 1980 Convention, in order to be effective in practice, should apply equally to non-international armed conflicts. In this regard, we should like to stress the importance of extending the Convention to all non-international armed conflicts, not only to those which have reached a certain threshold.

It is generally agreed that a major weakness of the 1980 Convention, and of many other conventions for that matter, is its lack of implementation mechanisms, and that this problem must be rectified during the forthcoming Review Conference. Given the importance of the issue, it is worthwhile to consider carefully which mechanisms would in practice be the most effective for this specific Convention. Although the ICRC sympathizes with the desire to avoid a system that is costly and complex, we wish to underline the importance of measures that are genuinely cost-effective. When one considers the figures cited in the Secretary-General's report on the horrific price that the indiscriminate use of mines is in fact exacting, it is worthwhile, even from a purely financial point of view, to ensure that the most effective implementation measures are adopted. We would hope, however, that the suffering caused by violations of the law will also be an important motivating factor.

The enormous scale of the problems caused by mines has arisen largely because of the cheapness and easy availability of these weapons. The experience of the ICRC is that the majority of suffering in armed conflicts, especially non-international ones, is caused by the massive and indiscriminate use of small arms. Arms-control and disarmament law has so far concentrated largely on containing the threat caused by the existence of nuclear weapons and, for the past two decades, on biological and chemical weapons. The fact that these have been little used or not used at all attests to the success of these efforts, which clearly need to continue unabated. However, the global problems caused by the largely unregulated manufacture of and trade in conventional weapons also need to be seriously addressed. The ICRC hopes that more attention will be given to the problem of the massive trade in small arms in order to introduce some workable limitations on their manufacture and trade. Until that is done, we will unfortunately continue to witness the carnage these weapons cause on a massive scale around the world.

Weapons that are indiscriminate in their effects or cause excessively cruel suffering should be subject to prohibitions not only on their use but on their manufacture as well. In this respect, we are of the opinion that there should be much greater complementarity between international humanitarian law on the one hand, and disarmament law on the other. It is unfortunately the case that once weapons are manufactured they will inevitably get into the hands of irresponsible users, and this is particularly true of small arms.

To conclude, the ICRC hopes that the Review Conference on the 1980 Convention will do much to make the Convention a dynamic and meaningful means of limiting the suffering and destruction caused by the use of certain conventional weapons in the conflicts that are all too prevalent in today's world. It is critical that all States speedily ratify the Convention and actively take part in its review so that its impact may be universal. We also consider it of utmost importance that the Convention be subject to frequent and regular review in order to maintain its relevance and credibility in the face of developments.

Ms. Lodhi (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, please accept the sincere congratulations of the Pakistan delegation on your election. We are confident that under your skilled guidance the First Committee will reach important decisions to promote disarmament and international security. I would also like to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Adolf von Wagner, for the effective manner in which he conducted the work of the Committee last year.

Mr. Stelzer (Austria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

During the past few years the world has witnessed many dramatic changes. Obviously, the most vivid of these was the end of the cold war and the collapse of communism. The inversion of the post-Second-World-War global order has dramatically altered, in every respect, the equation by which nations deal with nations. But it has not proved to be the ultimate panacea for which we had all prayed.

While the threat of a global war and nuclear catastrophe has receded, the world remains a dangerous place. Threats to global security now emanate from a variety of sources: regional confrontations, the policies of local hegemons and the massive and unrestrained violations of human rights by certain nations. Cinders and sparks can start massive forest fires just as effectively as an incendiary bomb.

The inability of the international community adequately to address these threats — the threats caused by ambition, foreign occupation, ethnic and religious conflicts and human rights violations — derives from a perception that equates security policy with arms control, disarmament and peace-keeping. But the factors that breed the insecurity that fuels the arms race are largely ignored. Consequently, we address the symptoms without curing the disease. This is apparent from the manner in which disarmament issues are approached today: in isolation from the conditions that breed insecurity.

One area where there has been progress is that of nuclear disarmament. The obstacles to the full implementation of the START I and II Treaties have been removed. However, further momentum towards the elimination of nuclear weapons may be retarded by developments in anti-ballistic missile systems.

Nuclear weapons must no longer be the principal currency of power. The Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament with the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons in a specified time-frame.

At the same time, measures should be undertaken to rectify the elements of nuclear instability which have emerged in the post-cold-war era. These efforts could involve the disposal of strategic weapons which are to be eliminated under existing treaties, assurances regarding the targeting policies of nuclear-weapon States, control over nuclear materials and technology that may lead to horizontal or vertical proliferation, and restraining the destabilizing effects of emerging technologies. The United Nations should convene a series of workshops to address these issues. Proposals generated in these workshops should then be considered by a conference of Member States.

In the area of nuclear non-proliferation, we attach importance to the measures currently under active consideration: the review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of fissile- material production. But these measures are being presented as a panacea for resolving the problems of nuclear non-proliferation. That is clearly not the case. Moreover, the manner in which some States seek to institute these measures has created doubts about their ultimate efficacy.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will be a valuable step towards both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, but such a treaty should be genuinely comprehensive and not provide loopholes for some States to conduct nuclear tests or continue the refinement of nuclear weapons.

The General Assembly has consistently emphasized the need for a halt in the production of fissionable materials and for the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses. Pakistan has accepted this consensus on fissile materials for many years. The language of the resolution adopted by the Assembly last year was formulated to secure the endorsement of certain hold-outs. We do not accept that this should now be used to compromise the long-standing non-proliferation objectives of the international community.

The resolution has been used in the Conference on Disarmament to suggest a highly restrictive mandate for the negotiation of a fissile-materials convention. Such a mandate leaves open the question of uncontrolled and asymmetrical stockpiles of fissile materials. If it is to have a non-proliferation impact, the convention must seek to reduce and balance fissile material stockpiles, especially among the non-nuclear-weapon States. We hope that our deliberations here will contribute to agreement on an appropriate mandate in the Conference on Disarmament.

There is considerable focus on the review and extension process of the NPT. While Pakistan has often stated its concerns regarding the inequities of the Treaty, we none the less support its indefinite extension if all its parties agree.

The Government of Pakistan has made it clear, and I will make it clear again today, that we will sign the NPT if and when our neighbour, India, does so also. Negotiations need negotiating partners. And right now, Pakistan sits at the table alone.

The nuclear tinder box of South Asia will remain the most dangerous place on Earth until or unless the parties — and here I mean specifically Pakistan and India — agree to negotiate and resolve the issues that divide them, including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, the nuclear capability of both countries, and the significant conventional-arms asymmetry between them. On all these issues Pakistan stands ready to negotiate just and reasonable solutions. But we cannot negotiate alone, and our Indian neighbours refuse to talk. Because of Indian intransigence, not only the region but the entire world is a much more dangerous place.

A viable way of achieving non-proliferation goals in the Middle East as well as in South Asia would be to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. The creation of such zones would promote regional security and global non-proliferation goals, including the universal acceptance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

In South Asia we face a far graver situation than elsewhere because of the threat of a nuclear arms race. In 1974, India detonated its nuclear device, euphemistically

called the "Smiling Buddha". Pakistan, in response, acquired a certain technological capability, but we have chosen not to build or explode a nuclear device.

Over the years, Pakistan has put forward a series of proposals aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation in the region. These proposals include: the simultaneous signature by both India and Pakistan of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the simultaneous acceptance of full-scope safeguards; mutual verification of nuclear facilities; a bilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty; and a bilateral declaration renouncing nuclear weapons. To date, these proposals have not been positively responded to. They are, like the dreams of the poet Langston Hughes, "dreams deferred". Instead of bringing hope, they have been allowed by India to "fester like weeds".

Given the increasing danger of nuclear proliferation in the region, we believe it is imperative for India and Pakistan jointly to renounce nuclear weapons. We propose that the two countries, as a first step, issue a joint declaration under which each would forgo the nuclear option and commit itself to a nuclear-free South Asia. To pressure one group of States to adhere to non-proliferation agreements without containing the nuclear threat posed by their adversaries is to invite certain failure.

South Asia also faces another threat: the threat of missile proliferation. India has embarked on an ambitious programme aimed at the development and production of short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. The Agni, an intermediate-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile, is in the advanced stages of development. India has also developed the Prithvi, a short-range missile capable of carrying a 1,000-kilogramme warhead over a distance of 250 kilometres. India conducted the final user trials of the Prithvi this year. According to official Indian sources, the Prithvi will soon go into serial production. The Prithvi is a mobile missile. Once it is produced, Pakistan will have to presume that it has been deployed. All our major cities except one will be within its range. Pakistan would then be compelled to provide a matching response.

We want to avoid a missile race in South Asia. An approach that deals only with missile transfers while ignoring indigenous development would exacerbate, not arrest, missile proliferation. Pakistan has proposed the establishment of a zero-missile zone in South Asia to prohibit the production, deployment and testing of ballistic missiles.

Another threat is looming over South Asia: the threat of a conventional-arms buildup propelled by adversarial regional relationships. The global focus on nuclear proliferation often obscures the threat posed by the conventional-arms race. It is conventional weapons that are actually being used in the current explosion of conflicts around the world; it is conventional weapons that consume 90 per cent of global expenditures on armaments; it is the threat posed by the imbalance in conventional defence capabilities that impels States to seek non-conventional means to deter aggression.

South Asia offers a classic example of the threat posed by the uncontrolled conventional-arms build-up by regional Powers. Since 1986, the Indian defence budget has exceeded $9 billion annually. The Indian conventional-arms buildup is an ongoing process, as evidenced by the 20-per-cent increase in India's budget in 1993-1994. India's massive forces, the third largest in the world, are overwhelmingly and ominously deployed against Pakistan.

Conversely, since 1990, Pakistan's conventional capability has seriously eroded. Pakistan has been subjected to discriminatory embargos. The resultant asymmetry that has developed in conventional capabilities does not augur well for regional security or non-proliferation in South Asia.

In order to promote conventional-arms control in South Asia and to reduce regional threats, Pakistan has put forward a number of proposals including: mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces; measures to prevent the possibility of a surprise military attack; and formulation of principles that would serve as a framework for a regional agreement on conventional-arms control. But again, no positive response to any of these initiatives has been forthcoming.

In South Asia, the key to agreement on both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction is a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Twice, India and Pakistan have gone to war over Kashmir, and Kashmir remains the major source of tensions between us. The time to negotiate a resolution of Kashmir is now, before a catastrophe happens, not after the fact. The Kashmir dispute will be resolved only when the people of Kashmir are allowed freely to determine their own destiny.

There is increasing awareness that the problems of Kashmir, conventional-arms control and nuclear proliferation in South Asia are inextricably linked and must be addressed in an integrated manner. Pakistan believes that

the major issues that threaten security in South Asia should be comprehensively addressed. Pakistan and the United States had separately proposed that Russia, China and the United States, as well as India and Pakistan, should hold discussions to promote security and non-proliferation in South Asia. This was accepted by all the proposed participants except India. Pakistan also accepted the subsequent idea of wider multilateral talks on South Asian security. This idea also seems to have become a casualty of an Indian veto.

During his recent visit to China, the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. William Perry, identified South Asia as a major challenge to regional security in Asia. He said,

> "We are on the brink of a nuclear-weapons race on the subcontinent, where relations between India and Pakistan have been tense for years.... The combination of nuclear weapons and enduring tension could prove catastrophic to both countries — indeed to the entire region".

We stand only a half-decade from the start of the new millennium. Our work in this Committee may well determine whether the new era is one of hope, of peace, of economic and social development, or, in the alternative, a da-capo repetition of the symphonic bloodbaths of the twentieth century. In Pakistan, we have chosen the music of development over the dissonance of decay. We urge our neighbour to join with us in a concert for peace.

Mr. Kittikhoun (Lao People's Democratic Republic): On behalf of the delegation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, I would like warmly to congratulate Ambassador Valencia on his election as Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. I am confident that with his rich diplomatic experience and skill, he will guide our work to a successful conclusion.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our deep appreciation to his predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, for his able stewardship of the Committee last year.

The end of the bipolar structure has brought to humankind a new hope: that of peace, stability and cooperation. Despite the emergence of new hotbeds of crisis and instability in various parts of the world, the longstanding and tireless efforts deployed by the international community for disarmament and international security have produced encouraging and positive results that could help curb the arms race and in particular prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In this time of opportunities and challenges, it is our hope that the First Committee, at the current session of the General Assembly, will help us to move progressively towards our common goal: general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Next year will be a time of great importance for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). With the wisdom of the States parties, I hope and believe that the 1995 Conference on the review and extension of the NPT, a very important event on the disarmament agenda, will reach a successful conclusion, as expected by the international community. To achieve and guarantee an effective non-proliferation regime, it is necessary to ensure real, universal adherence to the NPT. The very wide acceptance of the Treaty illustrates the significant value of its crucial contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. In this spirit, my delegation welcomes the recent accession of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia to the NPT, and the intention of Argentina to accede to the Treaty before the 1995 Conference. Adherence by additional countries would be most welcome.

With regard to nuclear testing, serious negotiations have taken place on a comprehensive test-ban treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is fundamental in preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. For that reason, we support the view that the earliest conclusion of the Treaty would have a significant impact on the decision on extending the NPT.

We also share the view that the conclusion of an effective international arrangement on credible security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would help facilitate the extension of the Treaty. Equally important for nuclear disarmament would be a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. It is our hope that we can achieve further progress in this field as well.

Land-mines are continuing to cause suffering and to kill civilian populations in various parts of the world. To eventually eliminate this horrible terror, the international community should make further concerted efforts to adopt a comprehensive ban on land-mines: a ban on their use, production, stockpiling and transfer.

This year again, the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to overcome the obstacles to an expansion of its membership. In our view, the composition of the Conference should correspond to the reality of our new era, an era of cooperation and dialogue between States. We all are called upon to take this into account in order that the present impasse may be resolved in the near future.

In South-East Asia, the atmosphere of cooperation and understanding among States in the region has been further consolidated. Exchanges of visits between them at the highest levels have taken place regularly, reflecting their common will to reinforce cooperation and mutual trust. No less important, a high-level consultative meeting, the Regional Forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, was held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 25 July 1994. That Forum has enabled the countries of South-East Asia and of the Asia-Pacific region in general to proceed to an exchange of views and consult each another on political and security issues of common interest and concern.

That first-ever meeting marked a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation in the annals of South-East Asian countries. As a country that has suffered much from the consequences of a long war, we took part with great interest in that meeting. We view its result as positive overall and express the hope that it will help strengthen and enhance political and security cooperation between States of the region. For its part, the Lao People's Democratic Republic will do its utmost to contribute sincerely to this effort in order to turn South-East Asia into a true zone of peace, stability and cooperation.

The chairman returned to the Chair.

Mr. Fofana (Sierra Leone): Mr. Chairman, let my first words be of congratulation to you on your election to a post in which you will guide the affairs of the First Committee. The wealth of your political and professional experience and your personal qualities will undoubtedly benefit the work of the Committee in the coming months. My delegation wishes you every success. Our congratulations go also to the other officers of the Bureau on their elections. I should also like to commend your predecessor, His Excellency Ambassador Adolf von Wagner of Germany, for the excellent and able manner in which he conducted the work of this Committee during the forty-eighth session. We also wish to express appreciation to the secretariat for the efficient work they have been doing during the past few months.

We are ready to work with you, Mr. Chairman, in this Disarmament and International Security Committee, in the conviction that it will advance the effort to reduce levels of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Five years after the end of the cold war, we must acknowledge that the reality of world disarmament has fallen far short of our dreams. This last decade of the century is one of uncertainties and contradictions. The comprehensive test-ban treaty, however, has brought new signs of hope, and there is a new impetus in international disarmament negotiations. There is now a historic opportunity to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The decision by most nuclear-weapon States to maintain moratoriums on testing nuclear weapons has made a major contribution to an improved negotiating atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament. Sierra Leone hopes that all the nuclear Powers will play their part in bringing the negotiations to a conclusion by abstaining from conducting further tests. An agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have a significant impact on the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and especially on the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Sierra Leone urges the international community to seize this opportunity and conclude the comprehensive test-ban Treaty as soon as possible.

Given the importance attached to the Conference on Disarmament, we call on the members of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament to take into account the views of countries not members of the Conference. To do so would result in greater support for the Conference's objectives and conclusions. In this regard, we wish to emphasize the support that exists for expanding the Conference: its membership should be increased in order to respond appropriately to the new challenges the world faces.

The issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is of particular importance to my delegation. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Sierra Leone remains committed to its provisions. However, there is much sympathy for the view that, for it to be universally accepted, a number of options would have to be considered.

The convening of the 1995 review and extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT provides a unique opportunity to make a sober assessment of the Treaty's implementation. There can be no doubt that the question of extending the NPT is linked to such critical issues as nuclear disarmament, the dissemination of nuclear know-

how for peaceful purposes, security assurances to non-nuclear States and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Hence, the issues we face next year should not be just whether the NPT should undergo a limited or an unconditional extension. The longevity of the Treaty will ultimately depend upon these issues being resolved and upon the sincerity of the nuclear-weapon States in the fulfilment of their obligations. My delegation is confident that, as we prepare for the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons next year, we should create an atmosphere of confidence among non-nuclear-weapon States so as to encourage them to come on board.

The NPT has been the factor underlying all the efforts by the international community over the past 25 years to stem the tide of nuclear weapons. Despite the general expectation in the 1960s that the world would have numerous nuclear-weapon States by the 1980s, this has not proved to be the case. Instead, realizing the danger of nuclear arms proliferation, 160 countries, including Sierra Leone, have now acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, leaving only a handful outside the Treaty framework. The peaceful-use assurances deriving from the Treaty and from International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards have laid the foundation for very valuable international cooperation in various fields such as nuclear power generation, nuclear medicine and in the agricultural and scientific applications of nuclear energy. In addition, the NPT incorporates the only commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to total nuclear disarmament, and, even here, more needs to be done if peace is to be maintained.

Disarmament as a whole should be seen within the context of preventive diplomacy. We must recognize the fact that the end of the cold war has not removed the danger arising the massive production of weapons. On the contrary, in some cases the danger has actually increased. Sierra Leone therefore believes that conventional arms control is an issue that should be tackled vigorously. In our view, we must focus on the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. We need to discuss universal and non-discriminatory means to enhance openness and transparency in that field, especially through the use of the Register of Conventional Arms. While transparency, restraint, responsible policies and good-neighbourly behaviour are essential elements for enhancing regional and global security and peace, it is clear that, if the situation in many parts of Africa is anything to go by, it has become imperative for the international community to address seriously the issue of conventional arms transfers. We must be most vigilant in monitoring transfers of conventional arms from producer countries through third parties to consumer countries.

However, one ray of hope is that the pace of chemical and biological disarmament continues to be very encouraging. Significant progress has been made in implementing the chemical weapons Convention, and measures are being taken to strengthen the biological weapons Convention. In our view, the international community will benefit in terms of security, trade and development from the total ban on these categories of weapons of mass destruction that will be put in place by the effective operation of the two Treaties.

The Sierra Leonean Government has always supported the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world. Accordingly, Sierra Leone has endorsed all efforts to achieve this goal and has supported all resolutions on the matter. We believe that the importance of these zones to the future safety of our environment should not be underestimated, and it is in this connection that the issue should be considered — with a view to making their establishment universal.

My delegation supports the moratorium on the export of land-mines. We further call for a ban on the manufacture and export of land-mines, as they continue to cause tremendous misery and untold hardship to many populations throughout the world.

We are intrigued by the fact that the arms manufacturing countries persist in producing these terrible engines of destruction, especially when it has been proved that this area is not particularly profitable for them. We call upon them to review their policies regarding the production of land-mines, as, inevitably. the people who suffer most are the most vulnerable populations of developing countries: women, children and poor farmers attempting to till their lands in the aftermath of conflicts. We urge the international community to extend additional control over the manufacture and use of, and trade in land-mines, given the indiscriminate manner in which they cause injury to civilian populations.

I should like to register our satisfaction that the Centre for Disarmament Affairs has kept its location in New York and has not been moved to Geneva. For most of us, this decision was a constructive one, that will enable small delegations, such as ours, to benefit fully from the activities of the Centre. We thank the secretariat for endorsing the views of the majority of delegations.

The Sierra Leonean delegation wishes to reiterate its support for disarmament and for stringent controls over all forms of arms, be they nuclear or conventional. As a country in the throes of a rebel war and that is implementing a substantial economic reform programme as well as a political transition timetable — all with all this taking place simultaneously — we have a special interest in the dividend from arms control and peaceful coexistence. We therefore call upon this body to pursue even more vigorously its goal of limiting the proliferation of arms and making the world a safer and more forward-looking place. We also wish to endorse the views of the earlier speaker who pointed out that disarmament would be even more meaningful if it were linked to a greater emphasis on development support for poorer countries.

Mr. Gyarmati (Hungary): As the Hungarian delegation is speaking for the first time under your chairmanship, Sir, permit me to extend to you our congratulations on your election to that important post. Your election is indeed a well-deserved acknowledgement of your diplomatic skills and experience, as well as a due tribute to the role your country has been playing in the United Nations. My delegation is fully confident that you and the other members of the Bureau will guide the work of the Committee with care and competence. Please rest assured that we shall help you in that endeavour.

On a more personal note, let me express my pleasure and honour at having a chance to share some thoughts on a few topical issues that are causing particular concern in my country.

The historic changes that have occurred in the world since 1990 have suggested to some that a new world order could be created easily and that, in that new world, there would very soon be no need for arms control any more.

Of course, the era of great-Power confrontation is over. Gone also are the huge armies of the two military alliances that had faced each other for decades. But the new world order has not yet taken shape and we still have to struggle with the legacy of the past. What is even more troubling is that nobody will dare say that any light at all is visible at the end of the tunnel.

Arms control will therefore have to remain on our agenda for quite some time. The great military capabilities created in another era have not vanished. On the contrary: the deterrent effect of the possibility of a large-scale confrontation no longer works, and more than ever there are conflicts raging all over the world, including in Europe, which, unprecedentedly, had been for decades the most peaceful continent. In those conflicts, more and more people are losing their lives and the demand for peace-keeping operations is constantly growing. Consequently, it is only right and proper to say that arms control efforts should not only be maintained but must also be reinforced in earnest.

The disarmament record of the Hungarian Government is not unknown in this body. I need not therefore go into detail, but will recapitulate briefly our main concerns and priorities. High priority, we believe, should continue to be given to non-proliferation, not only of nuclear weapons but also of other technologies. Hungary unreservedly supports the unlimited and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the adherence of all to the requirements of the missile-technology control regime, the creation and effective functioning of a new export control body to replace the outdated Coordinating Committee for Exports to Communist Areas (COCOM), efforts aimed at achieving substantial progress towards greater transparency in armament and military budgets, and the strengthening of all other similar institutions and arrangements.

In addition, there is a particular area of arms control to which, in our judgement, not enough attention has been devoted and where efforts should be resolutely reinforced. That field is conventional arms control. It is anyway an understatement these days to call "high-tech" weapons "conventional". The amount of destruction those weapons can cause can be very nearly as great as that caused by nuclear weapons. And, even more important, we must not forget that all major conflicts and wars in the past few decades have been fought with conventional weapons, and hundreds of thousands of innocent people have been killed in a "conventional" manner.

In Europe, we have managed to create and successfully implement a major conventional-arms control agreement, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE Treaty has been extremely effective. The destruction obligations under that Treaty are bring about the elimination of more heavy weapons than were used during the Second World War. Although the Treaty was drafted and signed in the final months of the cold war and was originally meant to eliminate large disparities between the two military blocs, one of which no longer exists, it proved possible to adapt it to the changing circumstances, and it has become a very useful tool in the successful management of the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the Soviet Union, and

is still helping maintain a finely drawn balance of forces in Europe.

The CFE Treaty is not only one of the few real success stories in conventional arms control, but is also an indispensable pillar of European security without which stability in the continent would be seriously challenged. This means that no changes in the Treaty can be allowed before it is fully implemented, i.e., before 1996. Alongside strict implementation, however, we will have to continue to adapt the Treaty to changing realities within the Treaty itself and take care of the concerns of some of its States parties, such as those of the Russian Federation and Ukraine relating to the so-called "flanks rules" of the Treaty.

Even so, we cannot close our eyes to the shortcomings of the CFE regime. The main shortcoming is that, based as it is — and for understandable reasons in the late 1980s — on the concept of eliminating disparities between the two military blocs, it does not constrain the armed forces of the other States in Europe. Many of those States, of course, are of no concern at all for European security and stability. It is very unfortunate, however, that one region of the continent — the most troublesome of all — was also left out of the CFE regime: I have in mind here the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I am sure that there is no need to explain why this is a major headache for us in Hungary, for the other countries of the region, and for all participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). We are therefore convinced that the — very urgent — next step in the field of conventional arms control must be the preparation and implementation of a credible arms-control treaty for that region. The new treaty must cover all the forces of the countries that have emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and it might also be worthwhile to integrate the other countries of the region in to its regime.

The arms-control arrangements could, of course, be based on the CFE concept, but in many cases we will have to recognize differences and also take into account the lessons of the past few years. Thus, for instance, we do think that the treaty should cover, in addition to the types covered by the CFE Treaty, artillery below 100 millimetres in calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, major naval surface warships and so on. The limits should be determined solely on a national basis, but verification of the treaty should be a common objective, in all likelihood to be carried out by an international organization. We think that the Western European Union would be especially suited to the job.

Subregional arms-control arrangements could be pursued in other parts of Europe, too, should the countries of a region deem it necessary. Hungary would certainly support any such initiative, especially in regions where the possibility of military confrontation, as a legacy of the past, cannot yet be ruled out, for example in the Baltic region.

Following the full implementation of the CFE Treaty and the establishment of subregional arms-control arrangements, the time will come to review the conventional arms control regime in Europe in general. We think that, at a certain point, when these conditions have been met, we should be able to prepare a new treaty in the field of conventional arms control covering the forces of all European States. That treaty could build on the CFE Treaty in many respects but should also differ from it. The main differences, in addition to its States parties, might lie in its geographical coverage, in an approach based on solely national obligations, in the internationalization of verification, and so on. The treaty should be developed with in the CSCE framework and become a major pillar of European security by the end of the century. It should also take into account the legitimate security requirements of all States parties, including, *inter alia*, the need for intra-alliance flexibility.

The Hungarian position on the present and future of arms control is very clear. We do not advocate arms control not for arms control's sake. Nor is it the self-interest of the distinguished battalion of arms-control diplomats that makes us so interested. It is our firm conviction that arms control is one of the most important stabilizing instruments of diplomacy, and that extensive use must be made of it in the future too.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the Permanent Observer of the Organization of African Unity.

Mr. Sy (Organization of African Unity) (*interpretation from French*): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, and the other members of the Bureau on your election to lead our Committee. I am sure that, with your skill as a seasoned diplomat and with your experience, you will lead the work of our Committee to a successful conclusion.

Among the positive aspects of the end of the cold war are the improvement of relations between the major nuclear Powers and the emergence of a more favourable climate for

resolving major international conflicts. This significant political development has had positive repercussions on negotiations in the nuclear weapons field and has already given rise to major disarmament agreements. Moreover, a military alliance conceived within the framework of the cold war has been dismantled. It is to be hoped that all the other alliances and instruments of the cold war throughout the world will follow the same path.

Even though the positive aspects of the post-cold-war period have allowed for a relaxation of tensions in certain areas of international political life, they have not, unfortunately, decisively strengthened international peace and security. The existence of well-stocked nuclear arsenals still threatens humankind with nuclear holocaust. The levels to which the great Powers and other countries in certain areas of high tension are armed and still aberrantly high. The arms trade is flourishing, thriving, and is fueling many civil wars, ethnic conflicts and tensions. The collective security system established after the Second World War shows serious flaws when it proves unable to prevent, much less stop "ethnic cleansing", genocide and other violations of human rights on a massive scale.

These threats we can all see are compounded by even more insidious but no less dangerous ones: poverty and economic stagnation, despair, the environmental degradation, pandemics and the drugs trade. These threats must be addressed globally and in a coordinated fashion, and with the same urgency. Furthermore, new instruments for cooperation must be established and the central role of the United Nations must be better highlighted.

On the issue of nuclear disarmament, we believe it crucial to emphasize the importance of continued efforts towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, we note with disappointment that a comprehensive test-ban treaty has yet to be concluded, despite the urgent requests of the international community. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon States have not yet received legally binding guarantees against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that such guarantees can not but strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world pending general and complete disarmament.

In Africa, the States members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have, since 1991, been engaged in the process of drafting a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Thanks to the support of the international community, and the United Nations in particular, a group of United Nations/OAU experts has worked on the treaty and has prepared a draft that may be approved as early as February 1995. The draft treaty was transmitted last June to the OAU Council of Ministers, which requested that it be distributed to all States members of the OAU. There are also plans to hold a joint meeting between the OAU intergovernmental group and the United Nations/OAU group to put the finishing touches to the draft treaty.

The draft treaty, the importance of which is obvious, meets a very long-standing aspiration of the African peoples and States to get nuclear weapons out of Africa. The draft is of great interest to the OAU, which, now the struggle against colonialism and apartheid is over and has decided to give priority to settling African conflicts. Indeed, without a peaceful and stable environment, the aspirations of the African peoples for economic betterment, development and democracy are likely to be thwarted. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa is therefore a part of the OAU's efforts to strengthen peace and security in Africa and throughout the world by creating a climate of confidence favouring the establishment of good-neighbourly relations, the settlement of conflicts and reductions in military expenditures.

The establishment in June 1993 by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU of machinery for the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts should allow our organization to play a pivotal role in the settlement of conflicts in Africa, with particular stress on conflict prevention.

Indeed, we are convinced that as conflicts are settled the implementation of disarmament measures will be facilitated. Thus, the draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa deserves the international community's support particularly those provisions that apply to territories in Africa but which belong to non-African Powers and the provisions on the non-use of nuclear weapons against States in the zone.

The African atomic energy commission provided for in the draft treaty also deserves support from the international community. Indeed, one of the major objectives of the draft treaty is to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy, especially for economic development. The African atomic-energy commission, which is to work in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will therefore have a key role to play here.

The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa was first put to the General Assembly in 1961. Since then, great progress has been made towards implementing it, particularly since favourable political conditions for it have been established in Africa. What we are asking for today is that the international community should provide the necessary support for finalizing the preparatory activities and that it should give the required political backing for the establishment of an effective nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament at Lomé. Because of the importance of the efforts to prevent and settle conflicts in Africa, the Centre must receive the human, material and financial resources it needs to play its proper role. The Centre would greatly benefit were it to coordinate its activities with those of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and engage in activities to complement those of the OAU's mechanism for conflict prevention, management and settlement. Here, we believe that, in terms of conflict prevention, it is important for the Centre to be able to participate in studying potential hotbeds of conflict and in helping identify possible sources for escalating violence and tension. In addition to paying greater attention to conflict prevention, the Centre ought to be able to continue informing the African public about disarmament issues by stressing the problems that are specific to the region.

Those are just a few of the OAU's concerns in the area of disarmament.

Mr. Al-Battashi (Oman) (*interpretation from Arabic*): On my own behalf and on behalf of the delegation of the Sultanate of Oman, I should like to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, our sincere congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We are confident that your vast diplomatic experience and your skills will have a great effect on our deliberations and will ensure the successful conclusion of our work.

I should like also to extend similar congratulations to the other officers of the Committee on their election, and wish them every success.

There is no doubt that the world today is undergoing many changes that are the inevitable results of the demise of the cold war. The world is now experiencing detente in the fields of disarmament and international security. While we appreciate the achievements made in this field, we feel that they fall short of expectations. Indeed, the modest achievements made so far do not measure up to the magnitude of the terror caused by the existence of weapons of mass destruction with their horrific potential for overkill which threatens the peace and security of the whole world and is cause for great concern to all the world's peoples.

As a case in point, we refer here to the Middle East region, where the threat of such weapons is a telling example of the extremely dangerous nature of these overkill weapons. The arsenals of nuclear weapons that are the monopoly of some in the region are cause for great concern. The fact that some are dedicated to acquiring components for this most dangerous weapon not only threatens the security of the region but also poses a very real threat to the security of the world we all live in. From this rostrum, we call once again, and hope that the call is clear enough, for narrow, unilateralist policies — that are not only egotistical but also obsolete, bankrupt, anachronistic and redundant, the residue of a past of competition, monopoly and indifference — to be renounced.

In our view, the ideal way to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to rid it of all other weapons of mass destruction — which are no less dangerous — lies, firstly, in desisting from the horrific stockpiling of those weapons with the aim of achieving dominance and imposing hegemony over one of the most important regions of the world. Secondly, there must be a total and absolute commitment to the principles of good-neighbourliness, peaceful coexistence and mutual benefits. In order to achieve this, there is an urgent need to engage forthwith in the business of confidence-building.

My country, as a developing nation, has taken it upon itself, since joining the international Organization in 1971, to adhere to these principles and policies, which have continued to prove fruitful in terms of our mutually beneficial relations with all peace-loving nations.

Among the prerequisites for ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons is that the party concerned must place its nuclear installations under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. Peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved through stockpiling weapons or by intimidating one's neighbours. It can be achieved, simply, through respect for the principles of international law in word and in deed.

The bitter reality that some have only recently come to realize is that one can change one's personal effects at will but one cannot exchange one's neighbour for another, no matter how one may try to intimidate that neighbour or

try to bring him to his knees. We in the Sultanate of Oman realized that quite early, at a time when we were about to gain membership of the international community, and we continue to hold to that realization firmly and absolutely. Indeed it has become one of the constants of our relations with our neighbours.

Ever since we joined the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, we have welcomed all efforts aimed at maintaining the region's neutrality, peace and security, which form the cornerstone of its prosperity and guarantee the development of the intertwined relations of its many States and peoples. We have taken it upon ourselves to reconcile the divergent views of the parties concerned, in the belief that true cooperation amongst peace-loving nations and responsible joint action by the States of the Indian Ocean region are the best means of implementing the General Assembly's Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. My country is well aware of the residual obstacles that continue to stand in the way of the work undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee. For our part, we are seriously trying, in cooperation with our partners, to overcome those difficulties by every possible means in order to ensure the success of the Ad Hoc Committee's work and to implement the Declaration. We shall spare no effort in that regard, as we are convinced of the importance of making the Indian Ocean region a zone of peace.

The results of the Ad Hoc Committee's work, to date, fall far short of our aspirations. This is because of certain narrow-minded policies and obstacles placed by some in the way of the Committee in order to impede its work. Our opinion in this regard is frank enough and is not open to haggling: the Indian Ocean region is no one's seisin, and in order for it to continue as it has always been — a multicultural region and an international waterway — there is a need for cooperation between all the parties with interests in it. Once again we call upon all the parties concerned to display greater flexibility in the context of the Ad Hoc Committee's work, to act responsibly and seriously and to avoid the temptation of pursuing devious policies that serve their own selfish interests. While we look forward with cautious optimism to the future work of the Ad Hoc Committee, we shall continue to voice our views with the usual clarity and frankness and shall continue to work diligently for the achievement of results that would satisfy us all.

Since it joined the United Nations, my country, a small developing State, has consistently supported every effort aimed at eliminating weapons of mass destruction. However, the persistence by some in stockpiling those weapons in an irresponsible and high-handed fashion makes us support the legitimate right of all non-nuclear States which do not possess any weapons of mass destruction to obtain guarantees covering the possibility of nuclear aggression against them. Such guarantees should be comprehensive, effective and deterrent. They should preserve the principle of balance and make any party with aggressive intentions think twice before putting such intentions into practice.

Because of its profound understanding of the significance of a clean environment for human life, my country attaches great importance to the question of the environment. The peoples of the Gulf region have suffered greatly from the environmental pollution resulting from the destructive wars in the region. Pollution is costing many lives and causing tremendous material damage in the Gulf countries, not to mention its effects on international navigation in the vital waterway of the Gulf itself. We therefore call upon all countries concerned to address this problem in the framework of disarmament and international security.

The development by some countries of their arsenals of sophisticated naval weapons has become a matter that should be taken seriously because of the threats it poses to the security of small States that do not possess effective naval defence systems. In this connection, we call upon all States that possess highly sophisticated naval defence systems to take effective measures to reduce the dangers that may result from naval confrontations or naval accidents, especially those which may involve ocean-going nuclear vessels.

With every passing day, the viability, effectiveness and significance of the United Nations is demonstrated by the important role it plays in solving international problems. We have always supported and will continue to support that role — especially since we small developing States find it of vital interest to us to maintain the Organization's momentum in the spheres of economic and social development, as well as in the area of disarmament, an area where the Organization will continue to play a major role, given the hopes Members pin on it with regard to the settlement of disputes and the achievement of international agreements that will be hugely important factors for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The decade of the 1990s has witnessed a qualitative transformation in the area of disarmament thanks to the tremendous international developments that have taken

place, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. My country was among the signatories of that Convention, and, by signing, Oman demonstrated its support for the efforts aimed at eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. These efforts culminated in unprecedented detente and understanding in the context of the Conference on Disarmament that led to the realization that it is necessary to find serious solutions to such important pending issues as nuclear tests and the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call for continued support for the Organization with a view to achieving the objectives set out in the Charter.

Mr. Batu (Turkey): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, as well as the other members of the Bureau, on your election. I am confident that, under your wise and able leadership, the First Committee will be successfully guided through its challenging agenda.

We are living through a phase of rapid historical change. Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world is still teetering between hope and despair. Although the ideological division of the world is far behind us, the international community is facing new challenges. Long-suppressed evil forces such as xenophobic and ethnic nationalism, and racism, have now come to the surface, creating new tensions, crises and conflicts that constitute new threats to international peace and security. To contain these new threats effectively, we should strengthen and expand the concept of crisis prevention. In this context, the priority focus of attention should be, more than ever, on arms control and disarmament.

Fortunately, since the end of the East-West confrontation, the prospects for arms control and disarmament as key instruments for greater security and preventive diplomacy have improved considerably. As was rightly stated by the Secretary-General before this Committee on 17 October 1994, never before has there been such an opportunity for global cooperation to this end. We strongly endorse his call to make full use of this opportunity.

We are deeply concerned by the risks posed by the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the biological weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have laid the groundwork for reaching a global consensus on how to build a safer world. Within a few months, we will be meeting here again to take a step of vital importance: to confirm the validity of the NPT and to extend it. With 165 parties, the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and reflects the international consensus against nuclear-weapon proliferation.

We have always considered the NPT a key multilateral disarmament agreement. By considerably reducing the risk of nuclear war, the NPT has made a significant contribution to international security and arms-control efforts. In principle, we support the indefinite extension of the NPT. We call upon those States that are still outside the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear States and to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We must stand committed to our common goal of achieving universal adherence to the NPT.

It is widely recognized that the NPT suffers from several weaknesses, especially in connection with safeguards and verification. The verification regime of the Treaty needs to be further strengthened. Turkey supports the new tasks and responsibilities undertaken by the IAEA aimed at increasing its role in developing a more effective safeguards system. While encouraging this development, we also believe that the 1995 NPT review Conference should make a new attempt to reinforce the safeguards system in general and the IAEA itself. This can be done, by the declared consensus of the signatories.

Ineffective controls over the removal, transfer and role of fissile material has emerged as a serious problem of the post-cold-war era. We have reported to the IAEA a number of incidents of illicit traffic in nuclear material in our country. We strongly believe that it is high time to develop a programme to stop this traffic. The programme should aim to assist those countries in which the smuggling originates to develop national control systems. The establishment of an international control mechanism could complement the programme. In this vein, we support the establishment of a standing group of experts within the IAEA to work out the details.

Turkey welcomes the statements by France, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Kingdom whereby they commit themselves to suspending nuclear tests. These are important steps, in conformity with the aim of international negotiations for a comprehensive test ban. Turkey supports the conclusion of a complete, universal and internationally verifiable test-ban treaty. In this context, we are following the Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty very closely.

With 157 signatories, the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons demonstrates the resolute determination of the international community to free the world from these types of weapons of mass destruction. Universal accession to the Convention should be achieved without delay. We call upon the signatories to complete the ratification process as soon as possible and hope that the Treaty will come into force before the end of the year.

We strongly support the efforts under way to strengthen the biological and toxin weapons Convention through the addition to its provisions, of a legally binding verification regime. We welcome the recent decisions of the Special Conference in Geneva to continue its work on an expert level and to prepare specific proposals for the fourth review Conference of the biological weapons Convention, in 1996.

It is our strongly held view that transparency in armaments is an important component of efforts aimed at building confidence and reducing unpredictability at the regional and global levels. In this context, we attach great importance to the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Security Forum. The Security Forum adopted principles governing conventional arms transfers on 25 November 1993. At the global level, we strongly support the work undertaken by the United Nations within the framework of transparency in armaments and consider it a contribution to strengthening confidence between States.

Turkey has supported all the steps taken in connection with transparency in armaments. In this respect, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a crucial instrument. A review of its first two years of operation indicates that the system's most important weakness is the fact that not all Member States have presented their reports. Therefore, the utmost priority should be given to ensuring that all Member States report to the Register. We believe that the development of methods that would encourage Member States in this direction should be considered. In addition, the scope of the Register should be expanded to include procurement from national production. The Register could thus become an effective instrument for the biological weapons Convention.

We take the view that full compliance with existing arms control and disarmament instruments at the regional and global levels is of primary importance for future arms-control agreements. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) constitutes a cornerstone of Europe's security architecture and establishes a stable and secure balance at lower levels of conventional armed forces. Turkey stands committed to and looks forward to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty. The CSCE Summit to be convened on 5 and 6 December 1994 in Budapest should reaffirm its commitment to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty.

The growing number of ethnic conflicts has amply demonstrated the vital role of regional arms control and disarmament efforts in buttressing the global quest for enhanced stability and security. There is now a pressing need to broaden the scope of arms-control and other security-building endeavours to embrace all the regions of the world. In this context, the Middle East is of particular importance for my country.

The historic breakthrough in the peace process which promises concord and cooperation between the Palestinians and Israel and between Israel and its Arab neighbours will contribute to the search for a new security structure and measures in the Middle East. The chances for disarmament, arms-control and confidence- building measures are now better than ever. We are participating actively in the activities of the working group on arms control and regional security established as part of the Middle East peace process. We are pleased to observe the growing acceptance of the need to complement the peace process with the eventual establishment of confidence- and security-building measures. We are aware that the divergent interests and the different priorities within the regional process and the complexities of the region's political landscape make these efforts a difficult undertaking. However, we are convinced that the progressive developments in the peace process will also create the necessary conditions for increased and shared security.

The Conference on Disarmament, as the only effective multilateral negotiating body, should respond to the changing political realities of our times. Last year, the General Assembly urged the Conference to reach an early consensus on the expansion of its membership by the beginning of the Conference's 1994 session. We regret to note that this did not happen.

We are disappointed that another opportunity for enlargement was lost during the last session. The time has come for the General Assembly to intervene constructively in the issue of expanding the Conference on Disarmament. A negotiating body such as the Conference should have the necessary representative weight to meet the challenges of our times by ensuring enlarged participation in the search

for new global commitments in the field of disarmament and arms control.

The O'Sullivan list is the only proposal on the table for enlarging the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that a solution to the current impasse can be found within the context of this proposal, and without further delay.

We look forward to the successful completion of our work on the rationalization of the work and modernization of the agenda of the First Committee during this session.

Indefinite extension of the NPT, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, strengthened conventions biological and toxin weapons and on chemical weapons are all within our reach. This is a historic opportunity that should not be missed. We must continue to work together with a shared vision of making the world a better and safer place.

Mr. Norberg (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of this year's session of the First Committee, and also to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their election.

In recent years, significant progress has been made in the field of disarmament. International treaties are now established for all existing categories of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a key to both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Since the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT in 1990, many important and to some extent decisive developments have taken place. No less than 25 States have become parties to the Treaty since 1990, including France and China. Sweden warmly welcomes the recent accession by Georgia, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mauritania and notes with satisfaction the declared intentions of Algeria and Argentina to accede to the Treaty. We hope that they will be able to complete the necessary procedures before the NPT Conference next year.

Adherence to the NPT is now firmly established as a norm of international behaviour. Sweden urges all nations to become parties to the NPT, and to act forcefully to implement existing safeguards systems.

The NPT contains two overriding and complementary elements. First and foremost, a commitment by parties to non-proliferation, in which respect the Treaty has been and remains an outstanding success. Secondly, a commitment by nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. In this respect, progress was long and distressingly absent, but an important improvement has now occurred, with the conclusion of the START Treaties and the prospects for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It is obviously of the highest importance that full results be registered in the field of nuclear disarmament without any further delay. The delicate and necessary balance within the NPT would then be a reality, which should be preserved as long as the dangers of proliferation and nuclear weapons exist.

Consequently, Sweden firmly expects continued negotiations on nuclear disarmament, on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on related questions such as a cut-off in the production of fissile materials and transparency in and control over stocks of weapon-origin nuclear materials with a view to proceeding towards the ultimate objective of a total abolition of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade nuclear material.

The objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are, as I have said, complementary, not antagonistic, and should not be used by any side as tactical bargaining chips in disarmament negotiations. The NPT needs to be extended indefinitely to help ensure that nuclear weapons are for ever discredited, and discarded from the arsenals of every State.

The regular five-year review conferences provided for under the NPT will provide important opportunities for ensuring that all parties fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and for taking the necessary action if they have not done so.

Since 1991, we have witnessed the conclusion of the first-ever agreement leading to the effective disarmament of nuclear weapons. The major reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals agreed upon under START I and II are a watershed in the post-war history of disarmament and arms control.

START I has now been ratified by all States concerned, but will not enter into force until all parties to the Treaty have acceded to the NPT. START II remains to be ratified. It is imperative that all States concerned take the necessary measures to implement these important agreements without delay.

The dismantling of nuclear weapons must be safe and the fissile material from them must be controlled. It is essential to protect this material and to ensure that it is not used for new weapons. In this task, the International Atomic Energy Agency could have an important role to play. It is also vital for prompt and effective international measures to be taken to prevent illicit trade in nuclear weapon-related materials.

Reductions in existing nuclear arsenals must be supplemented by a cut-off, that is, a complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Sweden sincerely hopes that negotiations in this field will start early next year in the Conference on Disarmament.

It is also more than high time agreement was reached on negative security assurances. States which have forsworn the nuclear option by adhering to the NPT or other legally binding international agreements — and effectively abide by them — have a legitimate right to enjoy such assurances.

The optimal solution would be a multilateral treaty whereby the nuclear-weapon States would unambiguously and without reservation commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

More than three decades ago, the world community for the first time called for the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. The main rationale behind this demand was the prevention of vertical as well as horizontal nuclear proliferation. This rationale remains as valid and pertinent today. On several occasions, Sweden has presented proposals for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are gratified that all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, are now prepared to negotiate such a treaty. It is essential for the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament to be concluded in the very near future.

Sweden appreciates the fact that four nuclear-weapon States are observing a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the outcome of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but we are dismayed that China has carried out two nuclear tests since the negotiations started in January 1994, the most recent during the early days of this session of the General Assembly. Sweden urges China to refrain from further testing and to declare a moratorium too.

Sweden welcomes the recent decision to establish an ad hoc group with the objective of proposing measures for strengthening the biological and toxin weapons convention. This is today the only major disarmament treaty without a verification system. We are convinced that the need for a verification regime will become increasingly obvious, particularly in view of recent developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering. Sweden will continue to contribute to the international efforts to establish a verification regime, which we hope will be achieved in the near future.

As the first industrialized country to ratify the chemical weapons Convention, Sweden urges all States to take the necessary steps for ratification so that the Convention can enter into force without delay. Sweden also calls on all signatory States to contribute constructively to an early agreement on the issues that remain to be settled in relation to the new organization that is to verify compliance with the Convention.

Horrifying pictures in the international media of children, women and men maimed and mutilated by land-mines have brought to the world's attention the urgent need to strengthen international regulations on the use of anti-personnel land-mines. Years after hostilities have ceased, these deadly seeds of war remain in the ground, causing indiscriminate suffering to civilian populations. Each day, children and other civilians are killed or injured by these mines.

Sweden is firmly convinced that an international, total ban on anti-personnel land-mines is the only real solution to the humanitarian problem caused by the use of these mines. Consequently, we have proposed just such a ban on all anti-personnel land-mines. In our opinion, not only the use but also the development, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of all anti-personnel land-mines must be prohibited. This issue is, in our view, among the most important topics at the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to be held next year.

We are encouraged by the support already expressed for a total ban on anti-personnel land-mines and feel confident that, once the full implications of the inhuman effects of these mines on civilian populations are fully realized, the world community will agree on the need for a complete prohibition.

Not only anti-personnel land-mines but also other conventional weapons should be discussed at the forthcoming Review Conference. Laser beams directed at

the eyes can cause permanent blindness. Hence, Sweden has proposed a ban on the anti-personnel use of laser beams as a method of warfare, to be included in a new protocol to the Convention. We feel it is important to stress that our proposal specifically concerns anti-personnel use and does not in any way relate to other applications of laser technology.

Naval mines are another category of weapons that must be dealt with at the forthcoming Review Conference. Like land-mines, naval mines do not distinguish between military and civilian objects. The perils for civilian shipping are obvious. Sweden has proposed that a protocol on naval mines be established under the Convention.

The preparations for the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention, planned for September/October 1995, are well under way. This treaty is sometimes called the Convention on excessively inhumane weapons, which very clearly describes its purpose. We urge all States to accede to the Convention in order to contribute to the further development of international humanitarian law in these important areas. The outcome of the Review Conference depends to a large extent on the widest possible representation, and we appeal to all States parties to participate in the preparatory work and in the Conference itself.

In the field of conventional weapons, openness and transparency in armaments is an important way of enhancing confidence between nations. At the global level, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms fulfils a unique function.

More than 80 countries reported their 1993 transfers to the Register. This number is, in itself, perhaps not all that encouraging. On the other hand, the reports submitted by these countries represent most international transfers of weapons covered by the Register. However, in order to achieve a global Register with universal participation, all States should submit reports. By so doing, they would contribute effectively to international confidence-building and thus to international security.

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is the only multilateral body with a mandate for negotiations on disarmament. The composition of the Conference does not, however, correspond to the present political map. Today, there are more countries with observer status at the Conference than there are members. In Sweden's view, the Conference should be open to all States that have applied for membership.

Finally, in recent years, important progress — inconceivable only a few years ago — has been made in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation. We must use the present momentum to strengthen and further develop these achievements. We should also be well advised to further intensify our efforts to abolish all weapons of mass destruction and to work for international peace and security.

Mr. Diall (Mali) *(interpretation from French)*: Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Malian delegation, most wholeheartedly on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I am sure that, thanks to your capabilities as an outstanding diplomat, our deliberations will without question lead to very positive results. Our delegation, for its part, would like to assure you of its fullest cooperation.

Our congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau and to Mr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany on the outstanding way he directed the work of our Committee during the forty-eighth session.

Last Monday, when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali addressed our Committee, he referred to the matter of arms proliferation in certain countries. In that connection, he pointed out that he had dispatched, at the request of the President of our Republic, a mission of inquiry to Mali to consider ways and means of gathering in the weapons sown broadcast throughout our country. According to the Secretary-General, that initiative has proved that efforts for arms regulation and disarmament can be effectively integrated into the broader framework of preventive diplomacy and the restoration of peace.

As the Secretary-General stressed, it was on the initiative of the President of the Republic of Mali, His Excellency Mr. Alpha Omar Konaré, that the United Nations Advisory Mission on illicit small arms in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion went to Mali between 14 and 21 August this year. During its stay, the high-level United Nations Mission met with a number of our country's leading figures as well as with officials from the civil administration, the gendarmerie, the customs bureau, the police and the armed forces. It met not only with representatives of the diplomatic community in Mali but also with key individuals and decision makers from non-governmental organizations.

For the best part of its time, the Mission operated in close liaison with the national commission of experts set up by our Government. On the basis of the terms of reference

handed down by the United Nations, the national commission of experts has produced a memorandum on the situation concerning small-arms proliferation in Mali. My delegation takes this opportunity to express again to the Secretary-General the sincere gratitude of the people and the Government of Mali for the attention he has given Mali's request and for having sent the Advisory Mission. Our authorities wish to see this activity continue so that tangible results are achieved.

The phenomenon of small-arms proliferation has now spread throughout our national territory and is indiscriminately affecting all strata of society. In the absence of precise statistics, the scope of the proliferation can be measured by the resurgence in armed crime. Several studies of the phenomenon have been carried out since 1990 and, specifically, there have been seminars with participants from various strata of society, but we have been unable to come up with any convincing results because of the lack of suitable tools to combat the problem.

The phenomenon actually shows itself in a variety of different guises: insecurity resulting from land-management conflicts between farmers, and cattlemen and others; poaching; the trend towards widespread self-defence; and large-scale cross-border or urban banditry. Small-arms proliferation has now reached proportions that are alarming both in terms of collective security and in terms of the very stability of the State.

In opening the work of the Advisory Mission, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali emphasized the alarming phenomenon of the unbridled and illegal proliferation of small arms both in Mali and the rest of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion. He stressed that no one can gainsay that getting the upper hand over this phenomenon would be a way to prevent conflicts and combat crime and banditry. The Minister also recalled that, so far, the international community had had its attention drawn to the proliferation of the so-called weapons of mass destruction alone, downplaying the destructive impact of small arms, although they, because of their size and the ease with which they can circulate, get past all controls and are as a result accessible to every sector of society.

The phenomenon of arms proliferation, which has spread far beyond Mali's borders to turn into a subregional or even a regional problem, needs action to be taken towards concerted, coordinated and dynamic international cooperation. The need for this kind of concerted action was stressed at the meeting of the Ministers of the Interior of the Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone at Banjul in May 1994. Similar meetings were held later in the year, in June in Algiers and in August in Bamako, Mali. These gatherings made possible the adoption of major recommendations concerning, *inter alia*, a ban on imports of weapons of war and ammunition; a ban on the unrestricted sale of weapons within each of the States concerned; the establishment and promotion of dynamic cooperation between the technical services responsible for security, defence and customs in order to identify channels for arms and ammunition trafficking networks with a view to shutting them down in the States concerned; and the harmonization of the States' domestic laws on arms and ammunition.

The proliferation of arms is not only a great danger to the security and internal stability of many States but is also a seed-bed for the conflicts convulsing the world. Mali's Head of State made his proposal to the Secretary-General out of the desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace. Mali's Minister of Foreign Affairs had the same thing in mind when the addressed the General Assembly on 6 October 1994 and drew the attention of the international community to the seriousness of the problem, saying:

> "Is it not also time to collectively address one of the factors underlying the development of armed conflicts in some regions of the world? I am thinking of the massive uncontrolled circulation of small arms in third world countries in general, and of Africa in particular. We are all aware that very few of these countries manufacture arms. So where do they come from? How are they channelled? What can we do about them?" (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 20th meeting, p. 25*)

At a time when our Organization is entering a decisive phase in its history, with the upcoming celebration of its fiftieth anniversary in 1995, the issue of arms control and disarmament is still one of mankind's major concerns. Our world will not be really free and cannot live free of the fear of destruction until we have rid ourselves of this threat for good. The delegation of Mali exhorts all countries to strive towards this ideal.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Mali for his kind words addressed to me and to the other members of the Bureau.

Mr. Eltinay (Sudan): My delegation joins the previous speakers in congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee and in

expressing our confidence that you will lead our work to success. Through you we send our congratulations to the members of the Bureau on their election and to your predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, for the tremendous efforts he exerted in the rationalization of the work of the First Committee.

In the post-cold-war era, it seems that the world is confronted with unceasing challenges in its endeavours to consolidate international peace and security. Some attribute these challenges to the spreading regional and internal disputes but fail to address in depth the root causes, while others refer to the tendency to stockpile weapons of mass destruction as their major source.

The plain fact remains that the major source of the unending international tension is lack of confidence. Confidence was immolated in favour of the short-term interests of the warmongers who dragged the world into the dilemma of the cold war and kept it there for more than four decades during which all kinds of weapons of mass destruction were stockpiled, posing a constant threat to mankind. Tremendous human and material resources that were badly needed for development were put to use in the race to acquire excessive quantities to weapons of mass destruction, and it is disheartening that there are still some who toil to maintain a world of confrontation under various pretexts, such as "conflict of civilizations".

Fifty years after the establishment of the United Nations, it is high time for the international community to consider reviving the ideals enshrined in the Organization's Charter and to demonstrate a sense of consistency in their efforts to realize them.

Sudan, which is fully committed to these principles, maintains that regional peace and security and international peace and security are indivisible, and that the major component of both is confidence-building. Chapter VIII of the Charter provides the basis for confidence-building and deals with the question of arrangements for the settlement of disputes at the regional level. Hence, the adherence of States to international law and to the principles of peaceful coexistence, good-neighbourliness, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of States is indispensable to international relations.

In keeping with its adherence to these principles, the Sudan has given the utmost priority to the issue of regional confidence-building through ministerial committees established jointly with neighbouring countries and other countries of the region. The most recent resulted in the agreement concluded with Eritrea in August 1994. The ongoing peace process aimed at securing a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict in southern Sudan — a process that was initiated by the Sudan — is indisputable evidence of the genuineness of Sudan's endeavours towards the maintenance of regional peace and security.

The representative of Kenya described to the peace process in the Sudan as "evasive". That description is not precise. A greater degree of accuracy is necessary if there is to be consonance between such remarks and the declaration made by the President of Kenya as head of the Committee of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). In view of the intransigence of outlaws, who are encouraged by the military and political backing of a State member of the IGADD Committee, the Government of the Sudan proposed the assignment of personal envoys to accelerate the peace process through shuttle diplomacy. However, the reference to peace in the Sudan was received by my delegation as an indication of good intent and motives with regard to the betterment of Sudan.

My Government reiterate its commitment to a peaceful settlement within a united Sudan, in conformity with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, with full recognition of the right of all citizens to express their cultural values. Further, we maintain that discussion of the issue of self-determination is a precedent that may endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all African countries, without exception, as ethnic diversity is a characteristic common to all States in Africa. Moreover, the right to self-determination is one to be exercised by people under colonial or foreign domination, and is not applicable to tribes or ethnic groups in an independent State.

African conflicts inherited from the colonial "divide and rule" era are attributable to disparities in development, and they should be settled through action to deal with their root causes, which are to be found in the realm of development. My delegation, while emphasizing the indivisibility of development and peace, regrets that certain developed countries persist in suspending development assistance to countries suffering internal conflict, thus aggravating the situation in such areas. We call upon these developed countries to reconsider their positions with a view to accelerating the peace process in the areas afflicted by conflict.

My delegation welcomes the signing, in Yaoundé in September 1994, of the non-aggression pact involving the countries of the central African region. We believe that this step will result in the creation of an atmosphere conducive to further economic and social cooperation in the region.

My delegation also welcomes the progress that has been achieved in the formulation of a draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and hopes that the Group of Governmental Experts will be given the assistance it requires to finalize the draft, including a definition of the area of implementation.

We also hope that specific steps will be taken to secure implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, with active participation by the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Despite the General Assembly's resolutions on declaring the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the realization of this goal continues to be obstructed by lack of political will. The courageous step taken by South Africa in renouncing its nuclear armaments needs to be emulated by Israel, which must heed the international community's call that it accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My delegation acknowledges the potential of the International Court of Justice as an important contributing factor in the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. We express the hope that the international community will make use of this potential for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and for defusing tensions arising from inter-State conflicts.

As we approach the 1995 Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we are disappointed that this important Treaty — and we are all duty-bound to strengthen it, as well as its regime for the total elimination of nuclear weapons — has become something to be haggled over. The attempts of the nuclear-weapon Powers to maintain the discriminatory nature of the NPT and their opposition to the calls for the universality of the Treaty to be affirmed are having an adverse effect on the process of building international confidence and securing complete disarmament. The non-nuclear States look forward to receiving from the nuclear Powers negative and positive assurances with regard to the non-use of nuclear weapons, as well as the nuclear Powers' commitment to the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to granting access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

A similar situation still confronts those involved in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is essential to the extension of the NPT. In this regard, we regret the lack of progress and the failure to achieve consensus on the question of expanding the Conference on Disarmament to reflect a universal and collective approach to disarmament through broader representation.

We urge that, in acknowledgement of the objective role that they continue to play in the field of disarmament, the non-governmental organizations be granted observer status at the Conference on Disarmament to enable them to make an effective contribution to international public awareness with regard to the vital issue of disarmament.

There is a common perception that the issue of disarmament is not confined to certain types of weapons, but includes all categories. Yet, one outcome of the selectivity approach adopted by some is that conventional weapons tend to be singled out when it comes to applying the requirement of transparency in respect of armaments. The United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons will not be effective unless it is expanded.

As regards the Register itself, we note its obvious lack of accuracy and the absence of complete information in reports. Illicit transfers of conventional weapons, including sophisticated types, continue to destabilize States where outlaws receive huge supplies of arms that encourage the escalation of conflicts and obstruct efforts towards peace.

Unfortunately, while we appreciate the role played by non-governmental organizations in the humanitarian field, some States and NGOs are involved in illicit arms trafficking and such information is not included in States reports to the Register; this must prompt new, creative methods of curbing this seed-bed of threats to international peace and security. My delegation fully supports the call for a code of conduct to be formulated that would put an end to these activities at the regional and international levels.

Africa, as the major victim of inter- and intra-State conflicts, needs prompt action to put an end to the conflicts that continue to drain its precious resources, not to mention, ending the loss of life they cause. Concerted efforts must be made and resources pooled to ensure that lasting peace prevails and to promote development in the

interests of the progress and welfare of all peoples of the continent.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Mr. Kenyon, has asked to speak. With the approval of the members, I now call on him.

Mr. Kenyon (Executive Secretary, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)): I am grateful to you for providing me once again with an opportunity to address this committee, and I thank the members of the committee for their courtesy in hearing me so late in the evening.

Two years ago, the General Assembly, acting upon the recommendation of the First Committee, adopted resolution 47/39 by consensus. This resolution commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, called upon all States to sign and ratify it and, in fact, paved the way for the signature ceremony in Paris, in January 1993, that launched the preparatory phase in the implementation of the Convention. It gives me great pleasure to have the opportunity to address the Committee today and to report on the progress being made in order to help bring into force this unprecedented multilateral Convention, which has created a global norm against an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. It is for this purpose that the Preparatory Commission of the future organization at The Hague is working, without exaggeration, around the clock.

Ever since the Convention was opened for signature at Paris on 13 January 1993, there has been a continued and growing realization that the Convention will help to promote global and regional stability by eliminating existing stocks of chemical weapons, and related production facilities, within a specific time-frame, inhibiting all States from acquiring chemical weapons, making the activities of States parties transparent through declarations and monitoring procedures, and by providing a forum for promoting international cooperation and resolving problems. This realization is reflected in the fact that the number of States signatories to the Convention today stands at 158, and 16 States have already ratified the Convention. Intended by its creators to remedy the defects of earlier multilateral endeavours, the Convention has indeed become a test case for a new type of multilateral disarmament agreement, with non-discriminatory measures to verify compliance, deter non-compliance, and if necessary, enforce compliance. A regime ruling out chemical weapons is thus beginning to emerge throughout the world, with very few exceptions.

The Commission regularly addresses the issue of universality of membership of the Convention, and I have personally been in touch with representatives of a number of non-signatory States in this regard. At its eighth session last month, the Commission again decided to encourage States that are not yet signatories to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible. The Commission requested me to communicate this decision to appropriate representatives of all such States and to include this decision in my statement to the Committee.

Last year, before this Committee, I had the opportunity to describe the initial progress in The Hague and the tasks to be performed by the Preparatory Commission in anticipation of the Convention's entry into force. The first task was to complete work on a number of detailed, technical procedures deliberately left over from the Geneva negotiations, such as the development of operational requirements and of the procedures for the conduct of inspections. The second was to build a new institution with a strong and cost-effective verification capability. The third was to help ensure effective national implementation by States parties. While the three tasks are not organically linked, there is necessarily a certain degree of interdependence between progress in The Hague and progress in national preparations by individual member States.

As far as the first two tasks are concerned, progress in The Hague has been steady without being spectacular. Eight sessions of the Commission have been held so far, and the Commission has achieved substantial progress in several areas, including, first, the inspection workload. Estimates of the approximate number of facilities which would fall under the declaration or inspection provisions of the Convention have been made. The annual inspection workload at entry into force is estimated at about 400 inspections. For the first year after the Convention has entered into force, 384 inspections are currently planned.

Second a general training scheme for candidate inspectors has been developed. National training offers have been evaluated, and certification of courses is under way. Applications from candidate trainee inspectors are being reviewed, and preparations are being made for the final selection process, which will occur seven months prior to the Convention's entry into force.

Third the equipment required for the conduct of inspections has been identified. Operational requirements for the major items of equipment have been agreed, technical specifications are under final consideration and the procurement of equipment has been authorized by the Commission.

Fourth, declaration forms for the chemical industry have, for the most part, been developed, and are contained in a draft declarations handbook. Inspection report formats have been largely developed for chemical weapons storage facilities, Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 facilities and challenge inspections. Formats for other facilities are under development.

Fifth, a draft under consideration at present of model facility agreements and guidelines and procedures for verification activities at chemical weapons storage facilities, when completed in the near future, is expected to serve as the basis for the development of other model facility agreements. The development of guidelines and procedures for chemical industry facilities is almost completed.

Sixth, most parts of a basic document entitled the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality are either complete or under active consideration. A classification system for the OPCW has been agreed.

Seventh, in respect of technical support, specifications for the OPCW laboratory have been developed, and the location of the laboratory together with the list of laboratory equipment and its procurement have been approved by the Commission. An OPCW health and safety policy has been adopted, and detailed regulations are under development.

Eighth, consideration is well under way of an OPCW media policy that will include procedures for the conduct of media relations during inspections and for finalizing visa-related practices in Member States to ensure the smooth entry of inspectors.

Ninth, in terms of institution building, the core staff of the Secretariat have been recruited and staff requirements for the build-up phase prior to the entry into force of the Convention have been identified.

A few weeks ago, the Commission agreed a total budget of about $30 million for 1995 — the budget is, of course, set in Dutch guilders. Approximately $15 million will be utilized for the continuing work of the Commission, with the secretariat remaining at roughly its current authorized strength of about 120 staff. At the present time, 106 staff members, representing about 45 nationalities, are working in the Secretariat.

Once 65 ratifications have been deposited, the additional budget funds will cover the activities planned in the six months immediately prior to the entry into force of the Convention, including the training of inspectors. The staff strength upon the entry into force of the Convention will be 370, and preliminary estimates for the OPCW suggest that its staff strength will level off in the region of 450 about six months after the entry into force of the Convention. Approximately half this number will be inspectors. The preliminary budget estimate from the OPCW itself is between $75 million and $80 million for the first 12 months, which is much lower than some earlier projections.

There are, however, several unresolved issues, some of them dating back to the negotiations on the Convention. The most important ones concern detailed procedures for challenge inspections; conversion of chemical-weapon production facilities; procedures to be applied to old and abandoned chemical weapons; and the issue of how and when the present export-control regimes should be reviewed in the light of the Convention's provisions on economic and technological development.

Several other tasks require urgent attention in the near future. These include developing a personnel policy for the OPCW in order to attract highly qualified experts; elaborating an information management system that meets the needs of verification while taking care of confidentiality concerns; finalizing the accommodation requirements for the future organization; and preparing for the transition between the Preparatory Commission and the organization itself.

Another category of issues, which hinge primarily on Member States themselves, include early identification of facilities that are likely to be declared and inspected upon the entry into force in order to define the magnitude of the inspection effort, and ensuring as wide a geographical distribution as possible in the future inspectorate by security applications by candidate trainee inspectors from all regions of the world.

With all this remaining to be done and considerable uncertainty remaining as to how much time we have left before the deposit of the sixty-fifth ratification, the Commission has recognized the need to try to improve the efficiency of its work and has started a review.

In addition to these tasks, which are being undertaken at The Hague, national preparations in Member States themselves are of considerable importance. While the legal process of ratification as such may be simple in many instances, the very nature of the Convention requires detailed preparations. In brief, these include prioritizing and assigning implementation tasks; preparing for declarations, including establishing data-collection systems; making contacts with the industry; preparing draft legislation; planning for the national authority; training escorts in receiving and guiding inspectors; reviewing and streamlining visa regulations; and sensitizing immigration and customs officials.

The Commission has adopted a number of basic assumptions that are important for the smooth entry into force of the Convention and its effective implementation. These include the assumption that the United States of America and the Russian Federation — the two largest possessors of chemical weapons — as well as the States possessing the large majority of declarable civil-industrial facilities will deposit their instruments of ratification prior to the entry into force of the Convention. The process will also be helped if the bilateral agreement of June 1990 between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons is in force and in the process of implementation, so that verification measures to be undertaken by the OPCW can be complementary to those carried out under that agreement.

It is clear that an earlier assumption of the Commission — that the Convention could enter into force on the earliest possible date, January 1995 — can no longer be met. However, there are no indications of any dilution in the basic commitment of member States towards an early entry into force of the Convention. It gives me great pleasure to report that the pace of ratifications has recently increased significantly. Seven ratifications have been deposited over the last 3 months, as compared to a total of nine over the previous 18 months after the Convention was opened for signature.

The Commission has also reiterated the commitment of member States to the early entry into force of the Convention and has called on member States to take appropriate measures to uphold and maintain the political momentum necessary to achieve this goal. Greater predictability in the timing of the entry into force of the Convention will be of the utmost importance in implementing plans for the OPCW, which require a certain lead time. However, it has to be acknowledged that, while most member States are working towards an early ratification of the Convention, such factors as the pressure of other parliamentary business, including elections in some cases, could contribute a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty to their estimated ratification timetables.

The secretariat is willing to offer all possible help to assist member States in their preparations and is also interested in forging links with newly established or designated national authorities in member States. A number of non-governmental organizations and research institutes have worked with the secretariat on the process of national implementation. In addition, seminars on national implementation are being held in The Hague and in various regions of the world, and direct contacts are being made with the industry world wide. Meetings of industry representatives are held occasionally in The Hague, and an industry outreach group has been set up to take care of particular concerns of the industry as to how it would be affected by the Convention. Earlier this year, the Netherlands hosted a course for national-authority personnel from developing countries. A similar course is planned for next year.

In conclusion, let me recall what I stated a year ago before this Committee: implementation of this Convention will require a high degree of perseverance and ingenuity. Sustained public and governmental support will be needed for its early entry into force and for its universality. The enhancement of security for all and the elimination of the threat of chemical weapons forever are the great benefits that the Convention offers. The road ahead is not easy. I am confident, however, that the Committee will continue to render its most valuable support.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Davinić.

Mr. Davinić (Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs): The Committee will recall that on Monday, 17 October 1994, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, requested a clarification from the Secretariat regarding the background paper (A/INF/49/3) on "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects", which was prepared pursuant to resolution 48/75 C.

He specifically raised two questions: firstly, why the said paper had not been forwarded to the Conference on Disarmament as stipulated in the above resolution, which

referred to it as "a representative intergovernmental group of experts", and, secondly, why the paper had not been circulated by 1 May 1994, as requested by the resolution, but rather on 20 May.

In response to the first question, I should like to recall that, while it is true that, in his statement on the resolution last year, the representative of Mexico referred to the Conference on Disarmament as the "representative intergovernmental group of experts" (*A/C.1/49/PV.3, p.6*), other Member States — basically those that voted against or abstained in the voting on the said resolution — contended that it was not. In order not to prejudge the interpretation of whether the intergovernmental group is the Conference on Disarmament or not, the Secretariat distributed the paper to all Member States so that those that felt that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate body to deal with it would be in a position to follow up the issue in that body.

As regards the delay in distribution — three weeks after the deadline — this was mainly attributable to efforts on the part of the secretariat to clarify how indeed this paper should best be distributed in order to fulfil its intended purpose. I very much regret if this created any inconvenience for any Member State.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): We have heard the last speaker for this afternoon's meeting. The Committee has thus concluded its general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items. In this connection, I should like to inform the Committee that 100 Member States and four observer delegations participated in the general debate.

Before I call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply, I wish to remind delegations that we shall follow the normal procedure for statements made in right of reply.

I now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Chandra (India): I am constrained to speak in order to set the record straight, as the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington has made a number of misrepresentations about the situation in southern Asia and pertaining to my country.

References to Jammu and Kashmir have no relevance to this Committee. Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. Despite this fact, Pakistan has got into the habit of raising the matter in every forum, including all other Committees of the General Assembly. Our views on this matter are well known and I will therefore not take up the Committee's time by reiterating them.

It is ironic that the Ambassador of Pakistan — a country which, by the published admissions of its own generals and leaders, started all three wars against India and possesses the atom bomb — should make out that there is a threat to peace from India. There is no threat to peace and security other than that caused by Pakistani involvement with terrorist activity directed against India.

Notwithstanding such provocation, India has acted with its customary restraint and responsibility. Contrary to Pakistani assertions, Indian defence spending — which has always been far lower than that of Pakistan, whether as a proportion of the gross national product or as a percentage of central government expenditure — has shown a steady downward trend in the past few years, coming down from some 3.9 per cent of gross domestic product in 1987 to about 2.4 per cent in 1993. In contrast, Pakistan's defence expenditure has been in the region of 7 per cent of gross domestic product over this period. There are, besides, a number of bilaterally negotiated mechanisms and confidence-building measures in position that maintain the peace.

It is well known that, in 1974, India conducted an underground, peaceful nuclear explosion, and has refrained from moving weaponwards. India's nuclear programme is entirely peaceful. Similarly, uninformed comments have been made regarding Agni and Prithvi. The former is a technology demonstrator; the latter has not been deployed and is in any case not intended to carry nuclear warheads. In contrast, Pakistan has already deployed missile systems Hut I and II, which bring within range much of western India, including New Delhi. It has since gone on a spree to acquire additional missiles.

The confidence-building measures proposed by Pakistan are an obvious bid to cover up its discomfiture and embarrassment at the fact that its clandestine nuclear-weapon programme stands exposed by its own admission. The measures have, moreover, been so devised that India cannot possibly accept them as they do not take into account our vastly greater defence responsibilities and, in the nuclear field, because they run counter to our principled position on the need to take into account the global reach of nuclear weapons and not do anything that would sanctify unequal treaties and the division of the world into haves and have nots.

Again, contrary to Pakistan's assertions, we have, in accordance with the Simla Agreement, made repeated offers to Pakistan, orally and in writing, for a bilateral dialogue towards an across-the-board normalization of relations. This offer has been backed up by a series of detailed and far-reaching proposals contained in six non-papers, including a number of disarmament-related confidence-building measures that build upon existing arrangements and are designed further to enhance confidence between the two countries. It is notable that these proposals include, *inter alia*, measures for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the line of control, the creation of a zone of disengagement in Siachin, the extension of the existing agreement on the non-attack of nuclear installations and facilities to include population centres and economic targets, an agreement on no first use or threat of use of nuclear capability against each other, and so on.

Pakistan has so far chosen to spurn the offer of talks and the proposals made by us, which gives the lie to its contention that there is a threat to international peace and security from India, for, if there were indeed a real threat, it would be unnatural to fail to engage in a bilateral dialogue and explore the proposals made to avert that threat. Pakistan has sought to raise the bogey of a threat to international peace and security merely as a ploy to internationalize the Kashmir issue. Any such move would set back the normalization process now under way there by encouraging Pakistani-supported terrorists and would exacerbate further India-Pakistan relations by giving a fillip to Pakistan's territorial ambitions.

Bilateralism, not third-party involvement, offers the best method for resolving differences between India and Pakistan. The latter approach was tested and found wanting in the two decades following India's gaining independence. It failed to prevent three wars between the two countries and to undo the injustice done to India by Pakistani aggression in Kashmir. Meaningful and lasting solutions to problems between neighbours are best found within the bilateral framework.

The late father of the present Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was then President of Pakistan, solemnly committed himself in the Simla Agreement to just such a course of bilateralism. We are surprised that the present Government of Pakistan has been trying to resile from this solemn agreement.

In her statement made earlier today, the Ambassador of Pakistan to Washington belaboured the point that Pakistan wants bilateral contacts to take place only in a multilateral framework. We have made it clear to Pakistan, and I should like to reiterate this now, that this is not acceptable. We remain, however, open to across-the-board bilateral discussions for a resolution of our problems: as our Foreign Secretary stated recently, "at any time or at any place in India or in Pakistan".

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): I should like to respond as briefly as possible to my colleague from India and the points that he has made. First, on the question of the bilateralism that India espouses, Pakistan is also committed to a bilateral process with India. This is not only within the Simla context; even before the Simla Agreement, India and Pakistan engaged in numerous rounds of bilateral talks, specifically to seek a solution to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

Today also, Pakistan is prepared to open bilateral talks with India, provided such talks are meaningful and substantive. We have held seven rounds of talks at Foreign-Secretary level over the past four years. At each round, whenever we raised the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir India shut the door in our face. It is for this reason that we have asked the international community to draw the attention of the Government of India and of the world to the fact that Jammu and Kashmir is one of the longest-standing disputes on the agenda of the United Nations and that it is a disputed territory whose final status is to be determined by an impartial plebiscite to be conducted in accordance with the wishes of the people. That is the text of Security Council resolutions, and we believe that India and Pakistan, and the United Nations, are all committed to the implementation of those resolutions.

If India is prepared to discuss the implementation of the resolutions, if India is prepared to discuss a final settlement for Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of those resolutions, Pakistan would be very happy to enter into talks; but in India's position there is a contradiction: it says that it is ready to discuss Kashmir, but at the same time it says that Kashmir is an integral part of India. The two positions are difficult to reconcile.

We believe that the assistance of the international community is required at this time to help India and Pakistan overcome their differences, because, as the Secretary-General said when he visited South Asia last month:

"We fear the escalation of hostilities between Pakistan and India could lead to an accident which would have disastrous repercussions."

This sentiment is also reflected in the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.

We believe that the international community — the United Nations — must play a part in avoiding the possibility of a threat to peace in South Asia. It is not sufficient for India to say that it subscribes to bilateralism, because bilateralism, for India, means the imposition of its hegemony over its smaller neighbours. No sovereign State represented in this Hall accepts that bilateralism should be utilized as a doctrine to prevent the fulfilment of the obligations of Member States under the Charter to implement the resolutions of the Security Council.

The representative of India also spoke about the nuclear issue. It was India that introduced the threat of nuclear proliferation to South Asia in 1974 by detonating a nuclear bomb. India can call it peaceful, but everybody knows that what India exploded in 1974 was a nuclear bomb. That capability of India's is there; it has been demonstrated. It is that capability that causes the primary threat of proliferation in South Asia.

Similarly, with regard to the development of missiles, it was India that took the lead and initiated the process of the development of the missiles that threaten Pakistani cities today. Indian missile deployment will lead to a most dangerous situation, and we hope that India will take heed of our statement and will accept the concept of a zero-missile zone in South Asia.

Finally, I wish to state that the world community cannot ignore the fact that, in South Asia today, there is a major threat to peace and security. In the month of August, Indian forces violated the cease-fire line in Kashmir 142 times. That is a figure accepted by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. If 142 violations of the cease-fire between two armies numbering almost 2 million soldiers is not a threat to peace and security in the world, we ask what is such a threat and whence does it arise? It is against that threat we ask the world community to take action.

Mr. Chandra (India): At this very late hour I shall be extremely brief. I wish to say that Pakistan appears to have many complaints and problems — nuclear issues, disarmament issues, cease-fire violations, and so on — and in our view, and I think everyone will agree, the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. Since that line between New Delhi and Islamabad is indeed the shortest one, I would request Pakistan to take up our repeated offers of direct bilateral talks for an across-the-board dialogue — since they have so many complaints — and for complete normalization of all relations.

None of the detours via New York and Geneva has proved useful, nor will they prove useful. I should like to end with a question: why cannot Pakistan adhere to its pledged word on the Simla Agreement and engage in these discussions to resolve all the problems that they have *vis-à-vis* India?

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): Let me respond to my colleague from India as briefly as possible. First, as regards adherence to Simla: was the Indian invasion of the Siachin glacier adherence to Simla? Indian forces still occupy Siachin, in direct violation of the provisions of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan has attempted, as I have said, on numerous occasions to resolve these problems bilaterally with India. It is still prepared to do so if India is prepared to undertake a serious and meaningful dialogue with Pakistan, if India is prepared for peace with Pakistan.

But, today, 600,000 Indian troops are in Kashmir killing, maiming and brutalizing the Kashmiri people. How can India expect to talk peace with Pakistan when it is making war on the Kashmiri people? We ask India in response: will you take your army out of Kashmir? Will you seek a peaceful settlement of Kashmir? If the answer is "yes", you will find us at the table tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.